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CHOOSING TAX: EXPLICIT ELECTIONS AS AN
ELEMENT OF DESIGN IN THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX SYSTEM
HEATHER M. FIELD*
Taxpayer choice pervades the federal income tax system. This choice can be
made either implicitly, whereby the taxpayer arranges his economic and/or legal
affairs so as to qualify for his desired tax treatment, or explicitly, whereby the
taxpayer merely tells the Internal Revenue Service how he wishes to be treated
for tax purposes, without having to take any specific non-tax actions or structure
his financial or legal dealings in any particular way. Scholars often focus on
implicit taxpayer choice and seek to hinder that type of tax planning. However,
explicit taxpayer choice garners little scholarly attention. This hole in the litera-
ture is surprising given that explicit taxpayer choices, in the form of tax elec-
tions, generally reflect pure tax-planning opportunities that are affirmatively
granted to taxpayers by Congress and the Treasury Department and given that
tax elections (9ntinue to be added to the Internal Revenue Code. To help fill this
gap, this Article provides a framework for understanding how explicit tax elec-
tions are and should be used in the federal income tax system. Specifically, by
drawing on a wide variety of tax elections, this Article discusses problems that
may be caused by the use of explicit tax elections, identifies and assesses four
major functions served by explicit tax elections, and derives a few generally
applicable recommendations about how to design explicit tax elections so as to
maximize their efficacy and minimize criticisms of their use. Despite the many
compelling criticisms of the availability of explicitly provided taxpayer choices,
this Article argues that carefully conceived explicit elections can be valuable
tools in the design and administration of the tax system. Moreover, by isolating
and analyzing situations where Congress and the Treasury affirmatively turn
over to the taxpayers the right to determine their own tax consequences, this
study of explicit elections can provide insight into the broader balance of power
between taxpayers and the government. And, at the very least, this Article brings
scholarly attention to the under-studied role of explicit elections in the tax
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Taxpayers wield significant power to choose how they will be treated
for federal income tax purposes.' In fact, all tax planning reflects taxpayers'
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author wishes to thank the University of California, Hastings College of the Law for its gener-
ous support of this project. In addition, the author appreciated the opportunity to present this
paper at the UC Hastings Faculty Colloquium and at the Tax Roundtable hosted by Santa Clara
University Law School, and the author thanks all of the Colloquium and Roundtable partici-
pants, particularly Daniel Lathrope and Daniel Simmons, for their feedback. The author also
wishes to thank Steve Johnson for thoughtful comments on a draft of this paper.
Taxpayer choice is contrary to the notion that taxes are compulsory transfers of funds to
the government. See, e.g., United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) ("A 'tax' is an
enforced contribution to provide for the support of government."); Adams v. Comm'r, 110
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choices to find some way to obtain particular tax benefits. Most taxpayer
choice is exercised implicitly through taxpayer action-the taxpayer ar-
ranges his economic and/or legal affairs so as to qualify for his desired tax
treatment.2 But other taxpayer choice is explicit-the taxpayer merely tells
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") how he wishes to be
treated for tax purposes; he need not take any specific non-tax actions or
structure his financial or legal dealings in any particular way in order to
obtain his preferred tax treatment. For example, before 1997, an unincorpo-
rated business entity could make an implicit choice about its tax classifica-
tion; if it wanted to be taxed as a partnership, it could choose partnership tax
classification by arranging its legal and business affairs to ensure that the
entity lacked a majority of the following corporate characteristics: limited
liability, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and centralized
management.' The check-the-box regulations, effective as of 1997, turned
this implicit choice into an explicit choice. Pursuant to these regulations, an
unincorporated business entity could choose its tax classification merely by
checking a box on a form; the entity could adopt whatever provisions re-
garding limited liability, management, continuity of life, and transferability
of interests best suited the business, unconstrained by the tax consequences. 4
The literature regarding tax planning (and its less benign cousins, tax
avoidance and tax evasion5) pays significant attention to the role of implicit
T.C. 137, 139 (1998), affd 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1117 (2000)
(explaining that "uniform, mandatory participation in the Federal income tax system ... is a
compelling governmental interest" (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700
(1989) and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982))); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., THE OECD CLASSIFICATION OF TAXES AND INTERPRETATIVE GUIDE 4 (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.oecdwash.org/PUBS/ELECTRONIC/SAMPLES/revenue methodology
2004.pdf (defining taxes as "compulsory, unrequited payments to general government"); cf
Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 2008) ("A foreign levy is a tax if it requires a
compulsory payment pursuant to the authority of a foreign country to levy taxes."). However,
the extent to which the federal income tax is truly compulsory is questionable, given the tax
elections discussed herein, other opportunities for taxpayers to reduce their taxes through tax
planning, and taxpayers' imperfect compliance with the tax laws.
2 For example, when a taxpayer makes an investment in a business, the investor and the
business can choose whether the investment will be taxed as debt or as equity by choosing
financial terms for the investment. Thus, the choice of the particular financial terms for the
investment implies a choice of tax treatment for the investment.
3 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) to (3) (1960) (amended Dec. 18, 1996).
4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215). However, the
line between implicit tax choices and explicit tax choices can be difficult to draw in some
situations. For example, although a taxpayer who receives a compensatory grant of restricted
stock has the ability to make an explicit § 83(b) election about the timing of tax on that stock,
the taxpayer and his employer also likely negotiated about the form of compensation, and thus,
the explicit § 83(b) election is only available because the employer made the implicit choice to
provide some of the taxpayer's compensation in the form of restricted stock. See also infra text
accompanying notes 192-95.
' The ultimate exercise of taxpayer choice involves the fundamental decision of whether
to comply with the tax law at all. There is a wealth of literature discussing how taxpayers
choose between complying and evading the tax law. See, e.g., Leslie Book, Study of the Role
of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws, in 2 NAT'L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 44 (2007), available at http://
[Vol. 47
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taxpayer choice.6 Scholars generally conclude that the ability of taxpayers to
select their tax treatment by arranging their business affairs in particular
ways is detrimental to societal welfare, especially where such arrangements
lack economic substance.7 Thus, commentators generally seek to stymie the
exercise of implicit taxpayer choice.'
Despite this emphasis on "design[ing] an income tax with a basic
structure that does not encourage tax planning,"9 little scholarly attention
has been paid to tax elections that explicitly invite taxpayers to choose their
preferred tax treatment. 0 This dearth of discussion is surprising given that
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc_2007_vol_2.pdf; Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Beyond Deter-
rence: Behavioral Decision Theory and Tax Compliance, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 821 (1991);
Michael J. Graetz et al., The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law
Enforcement, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 1 (1986); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cogni-
tive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review and Recommendations for the IRS Regard-
ing Individual Taxpayers, in 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra, at 44; Leandra Lederman,
The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 1453
(2003). This Article discusses a different kind of choice-choices that taxpayers make within
the bounds of the tax law.
6 See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Tax Planning, Effective Marginal Tax Rates, and the Struc-
ture of the Income Tax, 54 TAX L. REV. 555 (2001) (discussing how the marginal tax rates
encourage taxpayers to take actions that reduce taxes); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Con-
straint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312 (2001) [hereinafter Schizer, Frictions]
(discussing that taxpayers can avoid the tax consequences of reforms by making relatively
small changes to their business deals); cf MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS
STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH (3d ed. 2005) (discussing how businesses can take actions
that allow them to effectively tax plan). Tax shelters are merely an extreme manifestation of
tax planning through the arrangement of a taxpayer's affairs in a particular way (i.e., implicit
taxpayer choice), so the literature regarding tax shelters is included as part of the literature on
limiting implicit taxpayer choice. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Problem, 57
NAT'L TAX J. 925 (2004); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpreta-
tion: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 697 (2009); David A. Weis-
bach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REv. 215, 222-25 (2002) (arguing that since
there is no way to distinguish tax shelters from "legitimate" tax planning, one should be
suspicious of all tax planning); George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters:
Taking a Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REv. 209 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 6, at 555-56; Schizer, Frictions, supra note 6 (noting that tax
planning can lead to waste and inequity); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of
Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 172, 178 (1996)
(discussing that the costs of tax planning include "regular deadweight loss-the inefficiency
caused by the reallocation of activities by taxpayers who switch to nontaxed activities; ... and
avoidance costs-the cost incurred by a taxpayer who searches for legal means to reduce tax
liability); Weisbach, supra note 6, at 222-25 (arguing that all tax planning is inefficient and
"positively bad for society").
8 See, e.g., Schizer, Frictions, supra note 6 (discussing the extent to which tax planning
can be curtailed by relying on "frictions"); David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives
and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339 (2000) [hereinafter Schizer,
Sticks] (discussing how tax reforms can be designed to "aggravate the planning option");
Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88
TAX NOTES 221, 223 (2000) (discussing the desirability of an economic substance approach to
curtailing "socially undesirable tax planning").
9 Knoll, supra note 6, at 556.
10 There is some scholarship that examines specific elections. See, e.g., Lori Farnan, A
Mandatory Section 338: Can It Be Implemented, 42 FLA. L. REV. 679 (1990); Heather M.
Field, Checking In on "Check-the-Box", 42 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 451 (2009). There is also some
literature discussing the common law doctrine of election, i.e., the concept that where a tax-
2010]
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tax elections generally reflect pure tax-planning opportunities" that are af-
firmatively bestowed upon taxpayers by Congress or the Treasury. 2 In the
limited situations where scholars have addressed the availability of explicitly
provided choices in the form of tax elections, they generally criticize tax
elections as complex, costly, revenue-reducing, and inequitable, while pay-
ing little more than lip service to tax elections' potential value.' 3
Nevertheless, explicit elections are littered 4 throughout the Internal
Revenue Code ("Code"). 5 Explicit elections have been part of the tax sys-
tem since at least the 1920s, 16 and both Congress and the Treasury continue
payer has "a free choice between two or more alternatives" and makes "an overt act . . .
communicating the choice to the Commissioner," the taxpayer is bound by his choice. See,
e.g., Aubree L. Helvey & Beth Stetson, The Doctrine of Election, 62 TAX LAW. 335 (2009)
(citing I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2002-52-059 (Dec. 27, 2002)); Steve R. Johnson, The Tax-
payer's Duty of Consistency, 46 TAX L. REV. 537, 577-80 (1991) (discussing various doctrines
that impose consistency requirements on taxpayers). Additionally, there are some articles ad-
dressing issues of compliance with, and revocation of, tax elections. See, e.g., MICHAEL B.
LANG & COLLEEN A. KHOURY, FEDERAL TAX ELECTIONS ch. 2 (1996); Victoria A. Levin, The
Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Tax Law: Equity vs. Efficiency, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1587
(1993); John MacArthur Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in
Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285-93 (1935); Edward Yorio, The Revocability of
Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1976). However, there are many fewer
pieces discussing whether taxpayers should be entitled to choose how they will be taxed; to
date, the most comprehensive discussion of this question is included as the first chapter in
Michael Lang and Colleen Khoury's treatise on federal tax elections. See LANG & KHOURY,
supra, at ch. I (lamenting the "dearth of authority" and trying to "cast some light, albeit
indirectly at times, on these questions"). However, even Lang and Khoury's treatise, which
was last updated in 1996, primarily focuses (quite usefully and admirably) on collecting and
explaining the details of particular elections. See id. H. David Rosenbloom also spends just a
few pages discussing the role of tax elections in our tax system. See H. David Rosenbloom,
Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections, Hypothetical Determinations, Related
Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 22-27 (2004).
" As explained above, in order to exercise explicit choice, a taxpayer need not arrange his
business or economic affairs in any particular way. Thus, explicit elections generally lack non-
tax business consequences. As a result, a taxpayer only needs to take tax consequences into
account when making a decision about whether or not to make an explicit election. In this
respect, the tax consequences are driven solely by taxpayer preference, divorced from the
substance or form of the underlying facts.
12 In comparison, tax-planning opportunities via implicit taxpayer choices exist anywhere
there are multiple different tax regimes. Implicit choices are merely byproducts of generally
applicable tax laws, whereas explicit choices reflect a specific intent to grant choices to
taxpayers.
3 See infra Part HI.
"4 The TAX ELECTIONS DESKBOOK, which provides technical information about how and
when to make specific elections, lists well over 300 tax elections. PRACTITIONERS PUBL'G CO.,
TAX ELECTIONS DESKBOOK ch. 1 (11 th ed. 2005) [hereinafter TAx ELECTIONS DESKBOOK]; see
also Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100-1 to -21 (as amended in 2008) (identifying about 200 elections
and providing guidance about the technical aspects of making such elections).
"5 Unless otherwise stated, all "section" references and references to the "Code" herein
refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the Treasury Regulations promul-
gated thereunder.
16See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240, 42 Stat. 227, 260 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1501 (2006)) (making the filing of consolidated returns optional rather than
mandatory); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919) (current version
at I.R.C. § 6031(a) (2006)) (allowing some married couples to choose to file a joint return
rather than two separate returns). See generally Maguire & Zimet, supra note 10, at 1288-91
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to add them to the Code and the Treasury Regulations, 7 sometimes without
any explanation as to why the determination of the applicable tax treatment
should be completely ceded to the taxpayer.'8 Thus, this Article seeks to
provide a framework for understanding and evaluating the use of explicit tax
elections in the federal income tax system. Using this framework, this Arti-
cle argues that explicit tax elections, in limited circumstances and when
properly designed, can be employed to accomplish valuable policy goals.
In order to develop this framework, Part II of this Article explains how
common criticisms of tax planning may resonate particularly strongly in the
context of explicit tax elections. Then, based on an examination of numerous
elections available in the federal income tax system, 19 Part III describes four
major functions served by explicit elections: reconciling discontinuous re-
gimes, facilitating tax classification, promoting simplicity and adminis-
trability, and otherwise condoning tax planning. The Part assesses each of
these four functions of explicit elections by examining arguments in favor of
and against each such use and by identifying key considerations that should
be taken into account when evaluating each such use of an election. Part IV,
which presents the last part of the framework, draws on experiences with
many tax elections in order to distill a few generally applicable recommen-
dations about how to design explicit tax elections so as to maximize their
efficacy and minimize criticisms of their use. Part V concludes.
Ultimately, this Article provides a framework for analyzing how ex-
plicit tax elections are used and should be used in the federal income tax.
This Article concludes that, despite the many compelling criticisms of ex-
plicitly provided taxpayer choices, well-designed tax elections can be useful
tools in the administration of the federal income tax. Moreover, by focusing
on tax elections, which are, admittedly, only a narrow subset of the choices
afforded to taxpayers, this Article isolates and analyzes some of the situa-
tions where Congress and the Treasury decided that it was appropriate to
allow taxpayers to determine their own tax treatment and engage in tax plan-
(mentioning several elections available prior to 1935, including the two cited in this footnote
and the "election to pay tax by installment," among others).
1" See, e.g., I.R.C. § 108(i) (enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1231(a), 123 Stat. 115, 338-41 (to be codified in 26 U.S.C.),
allowing taxpayers to elect to defer the inclusion of income from certain cancellation of in-
debtedness income); id. § 172(b)(l)(H) (2006) amended by American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009 at § 1211, 123 Stat. 335-36 (to be codified in 26 U.S.C.) (allowing certain
small businesses to elect to carryback net operating losses beyond the normal two-year car-
ryback period); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(n) (2009) (providing that certain taxpayers could elect to
apply new transfer pricing regulations retroactively).
"8 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 634-35 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the confer-
ence agreement adds an election to newly added § 362(e), despite the absence of that election
in either the House or Senate bills and without giving much explanation for the addition of the
election).
'9 This Article's inquiry is generally limited to the U.S. federal income tax as applied to
individuals, corporations, and partnerships because those are the disciplines with which the
author is most familiar. However, this Article's discussion of explicit elections can be ex-
panded to include other tax regimes as well, such as the estate tax.
2010]
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ning. This analysis provides insight into, and invites further scholarly discus-
sion of, broader questions about the role of taxpayers in determining their
own tax treatment and about the relationship between taxpayers and the tax
system.
II. THE TROUBLE WITH EXPLICIT ELECTIONS
Many tax academics seem to have an instinctive distaste for explicit
elections in the tax system.20 While there is not an extensive body of litera-
ture explaining the aversion to the use of explicit elections,2' scholars' dis-
comfort with the use of tax elections is not surprising given that explicit
elections raise many of the same normative concerns as general tax planning
opportunities,22 which have garnered a substantial amount of academic atten-
tion.23 The availability of tax planning opportunities is criticized as complex,
costly, wasteful, revenue reducing, and inequitable,24 and these critiques may
resonate particularly strongly in the context of explicit elections.25
20 See, e.g., George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy
Questions Stimulated by the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125, 129-34
(1997) (questioning why the taxation of business enterprise should be determined by explicit
taxpayer election). Anecdotal evidence of this distaste for the use of elections in tax law also
comes from conversations that the author had with other tax professors in starting to think
about this project (one of whom frankly said about elections, "My tendency is not to like
them.") and from the resistance encountered in response to the author's proposal for an explic-
itly elective approach to the taxation of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations. See
Heather M. Field, Fiction, Form, and Substance in Subchapter K: Taxing Partnership Mergers,
Divisions, and Incorporations, 44 SAN DIEo L. REV. 259 (2007).
2! See supra note 10.
22 References herein to tax planning opportunities include the availability of implicit
choices, whereby taxpayers can arrange their economic and legal affairs so as to obtain
favorable tax treatment rather than less favorable tax treatment. While Judge Learned Hand
famously noted in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), that "[a]ny one
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes," the policy issues raised by tax planning lead commentators to seek ways to curtail tax
planning. See supra notes 7-8.
23 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 8; Schizer, Frictions, supra note 6; Schizer, Sticks, supra
note 8; Weisbach, supra note 6.
24 See, e.g., Schizer, Sticks, supra note 8, at 1351-54.
25 It is important to note that each general criticism may not be equally applicable to every
individual tax election. That is, some elections may create more complexity than others, some
elections may result in more revenue reduction than others, and some elections may create
more inequity than others.
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Explicit elections can create complexity in several ways. 26 A taxpayer
must determine whether he is eligible to make the election;27 if eligible, the
taxpayer must analyze the benefits and burdens of each alternative available
pursuant to the election, just as taxpayers must do when considering other
tax planning opportunities.
Determining which alternative is more favorable may be relatively easy
where all of the relevant facts are known and where the election applies only
to a single event with no impact on the future, such as a taxpayer's decision
whether to take the standard deduction or itemize deductions in a particular
year.28 However, determining whether an election is favorable can be diffi-
cult, particularly if the election binds the taxpayer for future tax years, as
with many accounting elections2 9 or the election to file consolidated re-
turns.30 Deciding whether or not to make an election may also be difficult if
the decision requires the taxpayer to predict what his economic and tax situ-
ation will be in the future,31 as in the choice of business tax regime 2 or the
26 See TAX ELECTIONS DESKBOOK, supra note 14, IC (discussing the "inherent complex-
ity" of elections); Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59
TAX LAW. 649, 662, 690 (2006) ("[e]very election . . . increases complexity and compliance
burdens.... Taxpayers must determine which election choice is most favorable"); Yin, supra
note 20, at 130 (calling elections "inherently costly and complex for the taxpayer"); Yorio,
supra note 10, at 463 ("Before a taxpayer makes a Code election, he should analyze at least
three critical factors."). The following discussion regarding the complexity problems raised by
explicit elections draws on these resources.
27 Some elections have numerous eligibility requirements. For example, in order to elect to
be treated as an S corporation, the corporation may not have more than 100 shareholders, may
not have more than one class of stock, and may not have certain types of shareholders. I.R.C.
§ 1361(b)(1) (2006). Determining whether some of these eligibility requirements are satisfied
can be less straightforward than it appears. See, e.g., id. § 1361(c)(1) (2006) (treating certain
members of a family as a single shareholder); id. § 1361 (c)(5) (2006) (addressing whether debt
will be treated as a second class of stock); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(b)(3) to -l(b)(5) (as
amended in 2008) (setting forth rules for determining whether there is more than one class of
stock); infra Part IV.B (discussing the impact of eligibility limitations as a key consideration in
designing elections). See generally JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS ch. 3 (2008) (devoting an entire chapter to the eligibility crite-
ria for making a Subchapter S election).
28 See I.R.C. § 63 (2006).
29 See, e.g., id. §§ 441 (f), 444 (2006) (choosing a taxable year).30 See id. § 1501 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(a)(2) (as amended in 2009).
31 In some circumstances, this difficulty in determining which elective alternative is better
may actually reduce the incentive to plan and the risk of abuse. Thus, where this uncertainty is
present, elections may not be particularly problematic. See infra Part III.D.2.
32 Subject to eligibility requirements, a business can elect to be taxed as a partnership
under Subchapter K of the Code, as a corporation under Subchapter C of the Code, or as a
small business corporation under Subchapter S of the Code. The desirability of one regime
rather than another depends on a variety of factors, including predictions about the amount of
future income/loss of the business. See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones & David Kirk, Choice of Entity
Planning After JGTRRA: Brainstorming the Triple Split, Bus. ENTITIES, March/April 2004, at
18 (discussing various considerations relevant to choosing among these business tax regimes);
John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey the
Stars Might Lie but the Numbers Never Do", 78 TEX. L. REV. 885 (2000) (same); Leslie H.
Loffman & Sanford C. Presant, Choice of Entity-Business and Tax Considerations, in 799
PRACTISING LAW INST., TENTH ANNUAL REAL ESTATE TAX FORUM 307 (2008) (same). In addi-
tion, certain businesses can elect to be taxed pursuant to one of numerous specialized regimes
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decision whether or not to make a section 83(b) election for property re-
ceived in connection with the provision of services.33 If, after weighing the
benefits and costs of an explicit election, a taxpayer decides to make the
election, the taxpayer is not required to alter his economic transaction to
achieve the desired tax treatment. Thus, it is easier to engage in tax planning
using explicit elections than using implicit elections. However, even after
deciding to make an election, implementing the explicit election can still be
complex-the taxpayer must determine the method for making the election,
including identifying what format the election must take and determining
when the election must be filed.34 These kinds of requirements are specific to
explicit elections as a category (as opposed to implicit elections) and vary
from election to election. Sometimes the requirements are so unclear and the
details so complicated that an entire treatise is dedicated solely to explaining
how and when to make each election.35
Once the technical requirements for making an election are determined,
the taxpayer must prepare and file the election accordingly. All of these
complexities are exacerbated by the possibility of errors along the way-
errors in determining eligibility for the election, evaluating the pros and cons
of making the election, identifying the manner and time frame for the elec-
tion, and actually making the election. 6 As a result, taxpayers may try to
for taxing particular types of businesses. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 851-855 (2006 & Supp. 1 2007)
(regulated investment companies); id. §§ 856-859 (2006 & Supp. 1 2007) (real estate invest-
ment trusts); id. §§ 860A-860G (2006) (real estate mortgage investment conduits).
" See generally Michael S. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint
Tax Perspective, 59 SMU L. REV. 721 (2006) (discussing a variety of considerations relevant
to determining whether a § 83(b) election should be made, including risk of forfeiture, volatil-
ity in stock price, and changes in tax rates, among others).
31 Where there is clear guidance about how to make the election and an IRS form on
which the election must be made, it can be relatively straightforward to determine how to
make the election. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (as amended in 2006) (specifying
some of the technical details about when and how to make an entity classification election);
IRS, ENTITY CLASSIFICArION ELECTION, IRS FOaM 8832 (2007), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf (providing the form on which entity classifications are made).
However, this is often not the case. For example, until regulations were proposed in August
2008, taxpayers lacked guidance about how to make an election under § 336(e). See Regula-
tions Enabling Elections for Certain Transactions Under Section 336(e), 73 Fed. Reg. 499965-
02 (proposed Aug. 25, 2008) (proposing regulations that explain how to make § 336(e) elec-
tions). Similarly, practitioners pushed the IRS to quickly issue guidance that explains the de-
tails for making an election under recently enacted § 108(i). See Amy S. Elliott, ABA Section
of Taxation Meeting: Practitioners Request Guidance on New COD Deferral Election, 123
TAX NOTES 831 (2009).
15 See generally TAX ELECTIONS DESKBOOK, supra note 14, IA. This treatise is a very
useful manual for explaining how to make elections, but it does not provide any policy or
normative insight into the use of elections.
36See Levin, supra note 10, at 1588 ("Because the elections are so complicated, even
well-trained, meticulous tax professionals are bound to make errors."); Yin, supra note 20, at
130 (noting "the possibility of error in making that choice" and using the experience with
Subchapter R of the 1954 Code as an example of a tax provision where an election "proved to
be a trap for the unwary"). Where taxpayers do not make an election correctly, they can be
denied their desired treatment. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm'r, 99 F.3d 1042 (1 lth Cir. 1996)
(failure to "unequivocally and unambiguously communicate[ ]" the election makes the de-
sired election ineffective).
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argue that a technically deficient election should still be effective,37 may
seek leave to file a late election,38 or may desire to revoke an ill-advised
election, 39 all of which add complexity to the tax system.
This complexity for taxpayers is often mirrored by the administrative
burden placed on the IRS. 4° The IRS must process explicit elections to en-
sure taxpayer eligibility and compliance with the technical requirements for
the time and manner of making the election. 41 In addition, some elections
require Service consent,42 which forces the Service to devote resources to
determine whether to allow the election in a particular circumstance. Fur-
ther, the IRS must deal with taxpayers who wish to file late elections or who
wish to revoke ill-advised elections. The IRS makes many private letter rul-
ings on these issues, 43 and sometimes litigation ensues."4 To the extent that
the issues arise because of the requirement that the explicit election be com-
37 See, e.g., TAX ELECTIONS DESKBOOK, supra note 14, IF (discussing the doctrine of
substantial compliance); Levin, supra note 10 (same).
38TAx ELECTIONS DESKBOOK, supra note 14, IE (discussing extensions of time for
making elections); Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-1 to -3 (as amended in 1997) (providing rules re-
garding extensions of time to file elections).
39 See, e.g., Yorio, supra note 10, at 465.
4°See generally LANG & KHOURY, supra note 10, 1.02[l][c].
" Of course, this process may be more or less burdensome for the Service, depending on
how complex the eligibility requirements are for the particular election. Additionally, the Ser-
vice is often tasked with the responsibility for setting these technical requirements because the
statute often does not specify how or when a particular election is to be made. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 754 (2006) (explicitly leaving to the Secretary the responsibility of determining how and
when the election is made). Lang and Khoury identify an administrative problem with this
approach, explaining that "[a]lthough an argument can be made that such matters are best left
to regulations, delays in the regulatory process often mean that even the most basic questions
of election procedure, such as the time for filing, are undecided for years after the governing
statute has been enacted." LANG & KHOURY, supra note 10, 1.02[1][c] n.21.
42 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 442 (2006) (allowing a taxpayer to change its accounting period only
if the change is approved by the Secretary); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(iv) (as amended in
2006) (limiting elective changes in entity classification to situations where certain factual re-
quirements are satisfied and the Commissioner permits the change). See generally LANcG &
KHOURY, supra note 10, 2.05 (discussing consent requirements). To alleviate some of this
administrative burden, the Service has provided for procedures pursuant to which a taxpayer
can obtain automatic consent for certain elections. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-36
I.R.B. 587, 606 (providing "procedures by which a taxpayer may obtain automatic consent for
a [specifically identified elective] change in method of accounting").
43 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-24-003 (June 13, 2008) (allowing a late entity
classification election); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-35-012 (Aug. 28, 1998) (same). The adminis-
trative burden of dealing with late elections is partly alleviated by Treasury Regulations which
already provide for an automatic extension of the time in which a taxpayer can file an election.
Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-2 (1997). However, the Service must still deal with the many taxpayers
who request discretionary extensions under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 (1997), and this requires
the Service to make a factually intensive determination as to whether the "taxpayer acted
reasonably and in good faith." Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(a), (b) (1997).
4 See, e.g., Cloutier v. United States, 709 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1983) (involving ability to
make a late election); Georges v. IRS, 916 F.2d 1520 (11 th Cir. 1990) (involving ability to
revoke an election).
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municated to the IRS in a particular manner, many of these administrative
complications are unique to explicit tax elections.
45
The complexity and administration requirements that may be created by
explicit elections come at a cost. Taxpayers must either spend the time and
energy themselves to undertake the election analysis, or they must pay tax
advisors to do so. Either way, the tax planning necessitated by the availabil-
ity of explicit elections may be expensive. Thus, resources are likely wasted
by taxpayers in the election analysis 46 and by the IRS in administering the
election.47 However, although these costs may waste societal resources, ex-
plicit choices allow a taxpayer to achieve a particular tax treatment without
having to alter his non-tax economic and legal arrangements, as is necessary
with implicit choices.48 Thus, explicit elections may actually distort business
and economic choices less than implicit tax planning opportunities. This
minimization of distortion may reduce "standard deadweight loss"-"the
inefficiency caused by the reallocation of activities by taxpayers who
switch" to lower-tax activities that the taxpayers would not otherwise pre-
fer.49 The net effect of these costs (both created and saved) on the efficiency
of the tax system is likely situation-specific, depending on how and to what
extent affording the explicit choice of tax treatment in a particular situation
leads taxpayers to change their behaviors. More broadly, the net effect de-
pends on what impact the availability of the election has on the performance
of the economy and overall societal welfare.
While the efficiency consequences of the use of explicit elections may
not be entirely clear and may vary from election to election, it is virtually
axiomatic to say that explicit elections reduce tax revenue. 0 Explicit elec-
tions, by definition, affect taxes only; they lack non-tax legal impact. Ac-
4' For example, entity classification elections must be filed with the IRS in a specific time
window. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006). In response to the administrative
burden imposed by taxpayers who often requested leave to file late, the IRS recently issued
guidance providing for "a longer period and simplified procedure to request relief from unfiled
or misclassified check-the-box elections." Jeremiah Coder, IRS Extends Filing Period for En-
tity Classification Requests, 124 TAX NoTEs 976 (2009) (discussing Rev. Proc. 2009-41, 2009-
39 I.R.B. 1). In contrast, implicit elections do not pose such burdens because the election is
made via the way the taxpayer arranges his economic and legal affairs and not via the filing of
a form with the IRS.
46 Using the terminology of Professors Slemrod and Yitzhaki (as Dean Schizer did in
Schizer, Sticks, supra note 8, at 1349-53), these costs include "avoidance costs" (i.e., "the
cost incurred by a taxpayer who searches for legal means to reduce tax liability") and "com-
pliance costs" (i.e., "the costs imposed on the taxpayer to comply with the law"). See Slemrod
& Yitzhaki, supra note 7, at 178.
47 These costs are "administrative costs" (i.e., "the costs of... maintaining a tax adminis-
tration"). Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 7, at 178.
4' For example, the adoption of new entity classification regulations effective in 1997
turned an implicit choice into an explicit choice and thereby eliminated the need for unincor-
porated entities to agree to particular business terms in order to achieve a desired tax treatment.
See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
'9 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 7, at 178.
S" Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral as We Know it: Simplification Potential of
Check-the-Box, 74 TAX Noas 219, 221 (1997); Yin, supra note 20, at 130.
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cordingly, a well-advised rational taxpayer will almost always" exercise the
election in a way that minimizes its tax liability, at the expense of the fisc. 52
Moreover, the opportunity to use an explicit tax election to reduce tax liabil-
ity may facilitate tax shelter activity,53 particularly given that, with an ex-
plicit election (as opposed to an implicit election), taxpayers need not alter
their non-tax economic arrangements in order to obtain favorable tax treat-
ment.54 That is, explicit elections generally lack "frictions" that impede the
use of the election for tax minimization purposes. 5 Further, taxpayers and
their advisors may devise unanticipated ways to use explicit elections to re-
duce tax liability. For example, the use of the entity classification election
for foreign entities has been heavily criticized as leading to abuse,56 and the
safe-harbor leasing election was ultimately repealed in response to taxpayer
abuse. 7
The ability of taxpayers to use explicit elections to reduce their tax lia-
bilities may also lead to inequity. While all taxpayers who are eligible for a
particular election are treated equally in the sense that they have the same
right to make the choice, the availability of an election "allows persons un-
dertaking the same activity to obtain different tax results" simply because
some taxpayers choose not to make the election.58 Additionally, an election,
while technically available to all eligible taxpayers, may be functionally
available only to the wealthiest, most sophisticated group of taxpayers, who
can best navigate the complexity of the election process.59 As with tax plan-
ning in general, other taxpayers may lack the knowledge or resources to pay
for advice that would enable them to take full advantage of the election. 60
" One significant (but difficult to explain) exception is that businesses sometimes elect to
use the slower straight line depreciation rather than accelerated depreciation. Cf Karl Ove
Aarbu & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Explaining Underutilization of Tax Depreciation Deduc-
tions: Empirical Evidence from Norway, INrk. TAX AND PuB. FIN., May 2003, at 229 (discuss-
ing possible explanations for taxpayer choices to claim less than the maximum amount of
depreciation).
52 Effectively, this enables taxpayers who are eligible to make an election to reduce their
tax liabilities, while ineligible taxpayers lack the opportunity to reduce their taxes. This conse-
quence implicates the intensely ideological questions of which taxpayers should see their tax
bills reduced, and who should be empowered to decide which taxpayers experience a reduction
in their tax bills.
" For example, the § 754 election was central to certain tax shelters like the "Son of
BOSS" structures. See, e.g., Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-
24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007).
14 See generally Joshua D. Blank, Confronting Continuity: A Tradition of Fiction in Cor-
porate Reorganizations, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 57 (2006).
" See generally Schizer, Frictions, supra note 6.
56 See Field, supra note 10, at 487-91 (collecting authorities and summarizing the criti-
cisms of using the entity classification election for foreign entities).
" Blank, supra note 54 (citing Alan J. Auerbach & Alvin C. Warren, Transferability of Tax
Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (1982)).
s STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, IOOTH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIs 65 n.149 (Comm. Print 2008).
29 See generally Rosenbloom, supra note 10, at 23-26.
o However, to the extent that an explicit election is used in lieu of an implicit election, the
use of an explicit election may actually increase fairness by enabling lower-income and less
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Moreover, explicit choices, like the availability of tax planning in general,
may impact taxpayers' perceptions of the fairness of the tax system.61 Tax-
payers may fear that they are "leaving money on the table" because of their
lack of knowledge, sophistication, or high-quality advice, while richer tax-
payers with high-priced advisors take advantage of elective loopholes, If this
is so, it could undermine taxpayer confidence in the tax system, leading to
reduced rates of voluntary compliance and greater enforcement needs.
62
Similarly, the ability of taxpayers to make explicit elections about their
own tax treatment seems antithetical to the notion of a compulsory tax sys-
tem.63 This deviation from a compulsory system may appear even more egre-
gious with explicit elections because the more favorable tax treatment can be
obtained merely by filing a form, without any private costs of restructuring
the underlying transaction. 64 Thus, explicit elections, which cede to the tax-
payer control over the tax consequences of particular events and which di-
vorce the tax consequences from the substance of the underlying transaction,
may be tantamount to partial deregulation of the tax system.65
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, it would be virtually impossible
to eliminate all choice, whether implicit or explicit, from the income tax. 66
As long as there are multiple possible tax classifications, treatments, or ap-
plicable regimes, taxpayers will have choices among them. Congress can try
to design a system that minimizes the incentives to alter behavior in order to
exercise tax choices, but the choices remain. 67 If taxpayers can make implicit
tax choices by arranging their substantive affairs to obtain one tax treatment
rather than another, there may be situations in which it is preferable, for
efficiency, equity, administrability, or other reasons, to allow the choice to
sophisticated taxpayers to avail themselves of the choice at lower cost. See infra notes 87-91
and accompanying text.
6 Cf Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1798 n.38 (2000) (citing Massimo Bordignon, A Fairness Approach to Income Tax
Evasion, 52 J. Pur. EcON. 345 (1993) (arguing that tax compliance is a function of perception
of fairness of government spending and of compliance of other taxpayers)).
6 Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived Fairness and Miti-
gating Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1515 (2005) (linking taxpayer confidence in the
fairness of the tax system with voluntary compliance).
63 Rosenbloom, supra note 10, at 23; see also Yin, supra note 20, at 130 ("In general, the
tax system does not permit taxpayers to elect the rules applicable to them."). However, as
noted above, this raises the question of whether the United States does and should have a
"compulsory" income tax system. See supra note 1.
6 In contrast, tax planning using implicit elections will generally only be valuable to
taxpayers when structuring a transaction to obtain more favorable tax treatment "generate[s]
more tax savings than additional private costs." Schizer, Sticks, supra note 8, at 1349-50.
65 See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Elec-
tion, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405 (2005).
' Presumably, a head tax, in which all individuals would be taxed the same amount,
would eliminate choice from the tax system, but this approach suffers from many other
problems. See generally Peter Smith, Lessons from the British Poll Tax Disaster, 44 NAT'L TAX
J. 421, 421-36 (1991) (describing the failure of such a proposal in the United Kingdom).
63 See Knoll, supra note 6, at 56.
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be made explicitly rather than implicitly.6" Moreover, whether or not it is
wise policy to use explicit elections, they are part of the tax system; they
have been since the early part of the twentieth century,69 and they continue to
be added to the Code.70 Accordingly, it is useful to think carefully about how
explicit elections are used in the income tax-in order to evaluate whether
existing explicit elections should be removed from the Code, to make edu-
cated decisions about whether new explicit elections should be added to the
Code, and to determine what factors should be taken into account when de-
signing explicit elections. Thus, the next Part of this Article seeks to under-
stand how explicit elections are, and should be, used in the income tax
system.
HI. EXPLICIT ELECTIONS AS TOOLS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
At the most basic level, all explicit elections involve situations where
multiple possible tax treatments could apply to a single economic event or
its close substitute.7' These types of situations arise often in the Code, but
typically the applicable tax treatment is determined based on the form or
substance of the transaction or based on policy considerations.72 However,
6 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law,
84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Line Drawing] (arguing in favor of
the explicit entity classification election on efficiency grounds).
69 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240, 42 Stat. 227, 260 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1501 (2006)) (allowing corporate groups to elect whether or not to be treated as a
consolidated group for tax purposes); Russell S. Bock, Elections vs. Tax Simplification, 22
TAXES 304 (1944) (discussing, among other elections, the election to take the standard deduc-
tion, as provided for in the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944); W.J. Schwanbeck, Elections
and Options Available to Taxpayers in the 1954 Code, 32 TAXES 748 (1954) (enumerating tax
elections available under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
"See supra note 17 (identifying a few examples of explicit elections adopted in 2009);
see also, e.g., I.R.C. § 108(a)(2)(C) (Supp. I 2007) (added by the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt
Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-148, § 2(c)(2)), 121 Stat. 1803, 1804 (providing insolvent
taxpayers with an election with respect to discharge of indebtedness on a qualified personal
residence)); id. § 164(b)(5)(A) (2006) (added by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-357, § 501, 108 Stat. 1418, 1520-21 (allowing taxpayers to elect to deduct state and
local sales taxes instead of state and local income taxes)); id. § 355(b)(3)(C) (Supp. 1 2007)
(added by Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222,
§ 202, 120 Stat. 345, 348 (adding a transitional election to the change in the active trade or
business requirement for tax-free corporate divisions)).
" For example, the grant of restricted stock (a single economic event) can be taxed either
at grant or upon lapse of the restriction; a § 83(b) election allows a taxpayer to choose the
former rather than the latter. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006). Another example is that different tax treat-
ments can apply depending on whether an acquisition of a corporation's business is accom-
plished as a purchase of the corporation's stock or as a purchase of the corporation's assets (i.e.,
formal transactions that are close economic substitutes for each other). A § 338 election is
available to treat the former like the latter. Id. § 338(a) (2006).
72 For example, financial products may resemble both debt and equity, but their tax treat-
ment as either debt or equity is determined based on the substance of the business arrange-
ment. See generally David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New
Financial Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499 (1994); William T. Plumb, The Federal Income
Tax Significance or Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369
(1971) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the factors that distinguish debt from equity);
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sometimes the Code or Treasury Regulations allow the taxpayer to explicitly
choose the applicable tax treatment.73 As discussed above, it seems antitheti-
cal to the notion of a compulsory tax system to allow tax treatment to be
determined based solely on the taxpayer's desires. So, the question is why,
and under what circumstances, should the tax system explicitly call on the
taxpayer to select which of the potential tax treatments will apply to a partic-
ular economic event. As this Part will explain, the federal income tax uses
explicit elections for numerous purposes, including reconciling discon-
tinuous regimes, facilitating tax classification, promoting simplicity and
administrability, and condoning tax planning. Ultimately, this Part demon-
strates that, despite the compelling concerns discussed in Part II, explicit
elections can serve valuable roles in the tax system, particularly where the
tax system itself is imperfect.
A few important caveats are warranted regarding this discussion of ex-
plicit tax elections. First, this Part draws primarily on explicit elections
available in the federal income taxation of individuals, corporations, and
partnerships, as these are the areas of tax law with which the author is most
familiar.74 Many explicit elections in other parts of the Code (particularly in
the gift and estate tax) are not addressed herein but do merit further study.75
Second, the elections discussed herein are divided based on the author's re-
search and analysis regarding their impact. The categorization often corre-
sponds to the legislative or regulatory intent behind allowance of taxpayer
choice, but sometimes it does not, particularly where such goals are not well
articulated76 or where there have been significant changes to the tax system
since the election was originally adopted.77 Third, this is not an exhaustive
list of possible functions for explicit elections in the tax system. Others may
Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1055,
1065-94 (2000).
7' See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 83(b), 338 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006).
7 Note that, even within these fields, this Article does not address all available explicit
elections.
71 This discussion is conceived as a useful place to begin discussions about explicit elec-
tions; perhaps additional papers can apply this Article's analysis to those elections. For exam-
ple, the author has written a separate paper regarding transitional elections, which discusses
the role of explicit elections in the specific context of changes in the law. See Heather M.
Field, Taxpayer Choice in Legal Transitions, 29 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2009).
76 For example, the legislative history does not explain why the § 362(e)(2) election was
added to the Code. See generally infra Part lI.D.3 (discussing this election).
" Fr example, the § 338 election was added to the Code in 1982, in an effort to limit
taxpayers' ability to achieve stepped-up basis when purchasing the stock of a target corporation
and paying only one level of tax. See H.R. REP. No. 97-760, at 535 (1982) (Conf. Rep.).
However, repeal of the so-called General Utilities doctrine in 1986 dramatically changed the
corporate tax regime in which § 338 operated, and that change largely eliminated the opportu-
nities for achieving stepped-up basis with one level of tax that § 338 originally limited. See
Mark J. Silverman, Section 338, in 827 PRACTISING LAW INST., TAX STRATEGIES FOR CoRPO-
RATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFs, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANizA-
TIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 155, 350 (2008). Now, a § 338 election generally results in two
levels of taxes-tax on the actual stock sale and tax on the deemed asset sale-and functions
primarily as the method through which a stock sale can be taxed as an asset sale. Id. at 231-67.
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argue that there are greater or fewer important categories, that the categories
should be defined somewhat differently than defined here, or that an entirely
different categorization system is appropriate."8 While this Article attempts
to create a framework for understanding the most significant ways explicit
elections are used in the income tax system, one of the goals of this Article
is to focus scholarly attention on how explicit elections are used and to en-
courage discussion on this and other issues. Finally, it is important to re-
member that elections may serve more than one purpose and, thus, may fall
into more than one category. Similarly, while this Article has tried to iden-
tify unique functions of elections, there is overlap between some categories.
Accordingly, the discussion of a particular election as an example of a par-
ticular role of explicit elections does not mean that is the only function
served by that election.
A. Reconciling Discontinuous Regimes
Very different tax results can follow from transactions that take differ-
ent forms but that are substantively, economically, or theoretically quite sim-
ilar. For example, the tax treatment of the sale of all of the stock of a
corporation can differ markedly from the tax treatment of the sale of all of
the assets of a corporation, even though both transactions result in the sale of
the corporation's entire business.7 9 This is a result of discontinuous tax re-
gimes-one set of tax rules applies to transactions taken in one form, and
another set of tax rules applies to substantively similar transactions taken in
another form. The sets of rules are discontinuous in that a small change in
the transaction's form can cause a different tax regime to apply, thereby re-
sulting in a large change in the tax consequences.8 0 Discontinuities can cre-
ate serious tax policy problems-they encourage tax-motivated changes to
the underlying transaction, thereby potentially undermining the goals of effi-
ciency and neutrality, leading to concerns about abuse, and prompting "ma-
jor struggles between taxpayers and the government."'"
11 For example, explicit elections could be divided into two categories: substantive elec-
tions (i.e., elections dealing with which tax liability rules apply) and procedural elections (i.e.,
elections dealing with the audit process, the collection process, and other issues relevant to the
way in which the law is administered).
79 See generally MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
BUYOUTS: A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNING TAX, LEGAL, AND ACCOUNTING
CONSIDERATIONS chs. 2 & 3, in 1.05-06 (Aspen Publishers, 2009) (discussing the tax conse-
quences of stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions).
80 See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 569, 597-98, 602-05 (1994) (explaining that continuity exists when "portfolios that are
nearly identical have nearly identical tax treatments. In particular, small changes in any portfo-
lio will not cause a 'jump' in the tax results.").
8, Id. at 603. Such struggles can include complex and possibly protracted audits and litiga-
tion in situations where the taxpayer undertakes tax-motivated changes to the form (but not the
substance) of a transaction in an effort to achieve a different tax treatment and the Service
challenges the taxpayer's preferred tax treatment. This, of course, assumes that the Service can
detect such taxpayer actions, which is not always the case.
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Explicit elections have been used to help reconcile such discontinuities
in the tax law. For example, § 338, which allows taxpayers to elect to treat
certain stock purchases as asset purchases, softens the harshness of the dis-
continuity between stock and asset purchases, 2 and § 1501, which allows
taxpayers to elect to treat certain groups of corporations as a single taxpayer,
smoothes the discontinuity between the tax consequences of operating a bus-
iness through a single corporation and operating a business through a group
of separate corporations.8 3 Similarly, where there is a purchase of a partner-
ship interest, a § 754 election enables the buyer to receive an adjustment to
the inside basis of a partnership's assets as if the buyer had purchased its
share of the partnership's assets rather than purchasing interests in the part-
nership.84 These explicit elections allow a taxpayer to choose to tax one
transaction pursuant to tax rules that would ordinarily apply only to a similar
economic transaction undertaken in a different form. Thus, explicit elections
can help bridge the gap between the relevant regimes. As a result, substan-
tively similar transactions can, at the taxpayer's discretion, 5 be taxed simi-
larly despite the transactions' different forms. 6
In addition to this potential equity benefit, using explicit elections to
alleviate discontinuities can effectively replace an implicit choice with an
explicit one. In doing so, elections can confer a neutrality benefit.87 The mere
existence of a discontinuity in the tax law provides taxpayers with the oppor-
tunity to make a choice-taxpayers can structure their transactions so as to
be subject to one regime or another. For example, a taxpayer can choose to
structure an acquisition of a business as a stock purchase or as an asset
purchase, and a taxpayer can choose to run a business in a single corporation
82 I.R.C. § 338(a), (h)(10) (2006). See generally GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 79.
83 I.R.C. § 1501 (2006). See generally GEORGE L. WHITE, CONSOLIDATED RETURNS: ELEC-
TIONS AND FILING A-29 to -37 (Tax Mgmt. 2006) (discussing the differences between filing as
separate corporations and filing as a consolidated group).
84 I.R.C. §§ 754, 743(b) (2006).
85 Note, however, that equivalent tax treatment for the substantively similar transactions is
not mandatory. Equivalent treatment is afforded only if the explicit election is made. Hence,
while the election advances the goal of horizontal equity, achievement of that goal is not
assured. See infra Part III.A.2, discussing whether explicit elections reconciling discontinuities
should be made mandatory.
86 Note that the election allows the transactions to be taxed "similarly," not "identically."
Even when the elections are made, there remain some tax differences between stock and asset
purchases, between separate entity and single entity treatment, and between the purchase of a
partnership interest and the purchase of partnership assets. These elections merely mitigate the
discontinuities between the regimes. For example, for purposes of determining whether a
purchasing corporation is liable for the target corporation's old taxes (pursuant to the collection
provisions in Subtitle F of the Code), a stock acquisition is not treated the same way as an
asset transaction even if a § 338 election is made. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-1(b)(3) (as amended in
2009).
87 Cf David W. LaRue, A Case for Neutrality in the Design and Implementation of the
Merger and Acquisition Statutes: The Post-Acquisition Net Operating Loss Carryback Limita-
tions, 43 TAX L. REV. 85, 218 (1987) (explaining that the goal of "functional neutrality" "calls
for impartiality in the tax recognition and treatment of acquisitions which are functional
equivalents of one another").
[Vol. 47
Choosing Tax
or in multiple related corporations. However, non-tax business factors, such
as concerns about protection from liability, may impede certain taxpayers
from exercising this implicit choice.88
Turning an implicit choice into an explicit choice allows more taxpay-
ers to avail themselves of the choice between the discontinuous tax regimes
and eliminates the bias against taxpayers who, for business reasons alone,
would have difficulty structuring their transactions to achieve the more
favorable tax treatment. Moreover, even for taxpayers who are able to ar-
range their economic affairs so as to be subject to their desired tax treatment,
the discontinuities in the tax law create a tax bias in favor of one economic
decision or another. As a result, taxpayers have incentives to make signifi-
cant changes to the form-but not the substance-of their economic ar-
rangements. 89 Although it is commonly understood that tax laws affect
taxpayer behavior,90 the tax law should, to the extent possible, minimize that
influence on taxpayer decisions. 91 Accordingly, using explicit elections to
alleviate discontinuity reduces taxpayers' incentives to alter their business
decisions regarding the structure of a business or business transaction in or-
der to obtain specific tax treatments. Thus, explicit elections enable taxpay-
ers to focus on the non-tax business and legal consequences, rather than the
tax ones, when planning and effectuating transactions. This can enhance effi-
ciency by relieving taxpayers of the need both to waste resources to restruc-
ture a desired transaction and to use a transaction structure that is suboptimal
from a business perspective in order to obtain a particular tax treatment.
88 For example, the purchaser of all of the assets of a corporation generally does not suc-
ceed to the corporate liabilities, but the purchaser of all of the stock of a corporation will
generally succeed to the liabilities of the corporation (at least indirectly, via ownership in the
corporation that retains its responsibility for preexisting liabilities). See BORIS 1. BrrITKER &
JAMES S. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
10.40[l] (2007). See also Field, supra note 20, at 278-81 (discussing business exigencies that
are relevant to the choice of form of a partnership merger, division or incorporation).
8 See, e.g., Ajay Mehrota, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Materialism, 83 IND. L.J. 881,
886 & n.19 (2008) ("tax benefits may influence the structure of-if not the decision to exe-
cute-a merger"); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860,
869 (1999) (describing how taxpayers can change their behavior to take advantage of tax rules
that "mistax" certain transactions). Moreover, there is an extensive body of literature about
how to structure transactions in light of the tax consequences of different forms. See, e.g.,
Kevin M. Keyes, Structuring Stock and Asset Acquisitions - Section 338 and Other Selected
Issues, in 770 PRACTISING LAW INST., TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DisPO-
SITIONS, SPIN-OFFs, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 743
(2007).
9 See, e.g., U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DE-
BATE: BACKGROUND, CRITERIA, & QUESTIONS 38 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov.
new.items/d051009sp.pdf ("Generally, taxes alter or distort decisions about how to use re-
sources, creating economic inefficiencies.").
9' See LaRue, supra note 87, at 218. Where the tax law is unbiased across economic
decisions of taxpayers, the taxpayers are generally free to take the actions that are optimal
from a non-tax business perspective. However, if tax law is biased in its treatment of taxpay-
ers' economic decisions, those decisions may be distorted, thereby possibly causing taxpayers'
decisions about whether and how to undertake transactions to be suboptimal from a non-tax
business perspective.
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Notwithstanding the potential policy benefits of using explicit elections
to reconcile discontinuous tax regimes, this use raises several issues.
1. Which Discontinuities Should Be Reconciled?
The tax system contains many discontinuities, and policymakers must
determine what situations are sufficiently similar from an economic or theo-
retical perspective that the discontinuity ought to be mitigated. This concept
of substantive "sameness" and equalization of tax treatment underlies each
of the elections mentioned above. For example, § 338, by allowing certain
stock purchases to be taxed as asset purchases,92 likens certain indirect asset
acquisitions to direct asset acquisitions.93 Similarly, affiliated groups of cor-
porations are allowed to file a single consolidated return94 because Congress
and the Treasury realized that "[i]n substance, there was little distinction
between a corporation that chose to conduct its business by means of divi-
sions and another corporation that preferred to operate its various businesses
through subsidiaries." 95 And when a partnership interest is purchased, a
§ 754 election allows an optional inside basis adjustment 96 that is "intended
to . . . approximate the result of a direct purchase of the [partnership's]
property by the transferee partner." 97 This reflects the aggregate theory of
partnerships, which conceives of the ownership of a partnership interest as
the ownership of a direct interest in the partnership's underlying assets.98
These laudable efforts to equate the tax treatment of similar situations
further functional neutrality99 but can quickly become complicated when
Congress must define which situations will be treated as sufficiently similar
92 I.R.C. § 338(a), (b) (2006).
93 See generally BiTrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 88, 10.41 (providing history behind the
enactment of § 338); LANG & KHOURY, supra note 10, 4.01[1]. Part of the rationale behind
the enactment of § 338 was to limit situations in which taxpayers could undertake stock
purchases and be taxed as if they had undertaken asset purchases. See H.R. REP. No. 97-760,
at 535 (1982) (Conf. Rep.); see also LANG & KHOURY, supra note 10, 4.01[3]; R. Lawrence
Heinkel, LR.C. Section 338 - An Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
158, 158-70 (1983).
94 I.R.C. § 1501 (2006).
9' KEVIN M. HENNESSEY ET AL., THE CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURN 1.01 (2008); see also
S. REP. No. 65-617, at 9 (1918) (adopting consolidated filing "because the principle of taxing
as a business unit what in reality is a business unit is sound and equitable"). See generally
Andrew J. Dubroff & John Broadbent, Consolidated Returns: Evolving Single and Separate
Entity Themes, 72 TAXES 743 (1994) (discussing the basic principles of consolidated group
filing, including that "a consolidated group should be taxed as if it were a single corporation
and as if its members were divisions of the corporation").
96 See I.R.C. § 743(b) (2006). When a § 754 election is in effect, a § 743(b) adjustment
changes the partnership's basis in its assets (i.e., inside basis). The net effect of this inside basis
adjustment is to treat the purchasing partner, for basis purposes, as if the partner had purchased
its proportionate share of the partnership's assets for fair market value.
SH.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 622 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).91See generally WILLIAM S. McKEE Er AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS T 1.02 (2008).
99 See LaRue, supra note 87, at 218.
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so that taxpayers can elect one tax treatment or another. 100 For example, with
respect to both the consolidated group election and the § 338 election, simi-
larity requires satisfaction of a threshold stock ownership requirement. 0'
Only where a corporation owns (or, in the case of a § 338 election,
purchases) at least eighty percent of the vote and value of the stock of an-
other corporation does the Code equate the ownership (or purchase) of stock
with the ownership (or purchase) of the underlying assets. 02 Since corporate
tax generally respects the corporation as an entity separate and distinct from
its owner, 03 the Code allows the owner (or purchaser) of the stock to be
treated like the owner (or purchaser) of the underlying assets only where
there is ownership (or purchase) of the vast majority of the interests in the
corporate entity.1°4 Absent that high level of stock ownership or purchase,
the chain of related corporations is not considered sufficiently similar to a
single corporation, and the stock purchase is not considered sufficiently sim-
ilar to an asset purchase. In such cases, no election would be allowed to treat
the ownership (or purchase) of stock as the ownership (or purchase) of the
underlying assets.
But what level of stock ownership or purchase should be required?
When determining a level at which ownership of an entity's stock is tanta-
mount to ownership of the entity's business, this eighty percent vote and
value threshold may seem reasonable, but the contours of this requirement
have varied over time: from a subjective "substantial ownership" test when
consolidated filing began, 05 to a ninety-five percent control test beginning in
"o Cf David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: The-
ory and Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 TAx L. REV. 215, 252 (2007) (commenting that
proposals to coordinate asset and stock acquisitions "are immensely complex because they
must draw a line between those cases where conformity is allowed and those where it is not").
Note that this Article does not attempt to define equality or sameness for purposes of determin-
ing whether or not an election should be used to bridge the gap between the tax treatment of
two formally different factual situations.
101 I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a)(2) (2006) (requiring that a corporation own at least eighty
percent of the vote and value of a subsidiary in order for the corporation and the subsidiary to
be eligible to file a consolidated return); id. § 338(d)(3) (2006) (requiring that the purchaser
purchase at least eighty percent of the vote and value of the stock of the target corporation in
order to be eligible to make a § 338 election). Additionally, in order to be eligible to file a
consolidated return, subsidiary corporations must not be one of certain types of excluded cor-
porations. See id. § 1504(b) (2006). Other limitations on the § 338 election include that the
purchase of the target stock must occur within a twelve-month period. Id. § 338(d)(3).
02 Id. §§ 338(d)(3), 1504(a)(2).
'o See, e.g., Moline Properties v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436, 439-40 (1943) (treating a corpo-
ration as separate and distinct from its shareholder-owner).
'04 In contrast, partnership taxation generally reflects a combination of entity and aggre-
gate theories. It is the aggregate theory that conceives of the ownership of a partnership inter-
est as the ownership of a direct interest in the partnership's underlying assets. See supra note
98 and accompanying text. Thus, under the aggregate theory, the purchase of any amount of
partnership interest could be considered theoretically the same as the purchase of interests in
the underlying assets, meriting the availability of the inside basis adjustment. I.R.C. § 743(b)
(2006).
'05 See WHrrE, supra note 83, at A-15 (citing Reg. 41, Art. 77 (1917)).
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1921,106 to an eighty percent voting control test beginning in 1954,107 and
finally to an eighty percent vote and value control test beginning in 1984.108
Along the way, the IRS and the courts have interpreted these control tests in
a variety of circumstances, thereby helping to shape these tests.' °9 Moreover,
there are many possible alternatives, including numerous other definitions of
control throughout the Code, I" and any threshold test for defining similarity
can itself create a discontinuity."'
Even this brief discussion of the control test for consolidated filing
demonstrates the difficulty of determining which economic arrangements are
so substantively similar to other formally-distinct economic arrangements
that the differences in the tax treatments of those arrangements should be
mitigated. This issue raises the question of the relationship between form
and substance in the tax law and is a specific manifestation of the question
that plagues analyses that rely on notions of horizontal equity-the "appli-
cation [of the principle of horizontal equity] rests on a determination that
parties are in equal positions; and the determination of equality rests on a
choice of the contact points that are to be compared, about which reasonable
people can disagree and often do so."''12 However, any use of an explicit
"s Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(c), 42 Stat. 227, 260 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 1504 (2006)).
'07 When lowering the threshold ownership requirement from ninety-five percent to eighty
percent, the Conference Report indicated that "[t]his change will make it possible for a sub-
stantially greater number of multicorporate businesses, which in effect operate as economic
units, to report their income for tax purposes as a single taxpayer." H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at
87 (1954) (Conf. Rep.). Note that, at this time, there was still a two percent additional
surcharge tax imposed on companies exercising the privilege of filing consolidated returns;
this was later repealed in 1964. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 234, 78 Stat. 19,
113-16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
108 I.R.C. § 1504(b). See generally WHITE, supra note 83, at A-15 (chronicling the
changes to the control requirement for consolidated filing).
'09 See WHITE, supra note 83, at A-15 to -24.
]0 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 368(c) (2006); William J. Rands, Corporate Tax: The Agony and the
Ecstasy, 83 NEB. L. Rav. 39, 59-64 & n.99 (2004) (listing several different control tests and
discussing the problem of so many different tests for control); Sec. of Taxation, Am. Bar Ass'n,
Comments on Proposed Change to Section 368(c) Definition of Corporate Control, 83 TAX
NoTms 1357 (1999). Additionally, other proposals for treating stock and asset acquisitions
similarly have employed different definitions for equating stock and asset acquisitions. See
Weisbach, supra note 100, at 244-56 (discussing two proposals for coordinating the treatment
of stock and asset sales, one of which focuses on whether "substantially all of the assets" are
transferred or whether a "major portion" of assets are transferred, and one of which asks
whether, among other things, at least seventy percent of the gross fair market value and at least
ninety percent of the net fair market value of the assets of a corporation have been acquired).
I For example, an eighty percent vote and value threshold for the availability of an elec-
tion to file consolidated tax returns means that a corporation, eighty-one percent of whose
stock is owned by another corporation, can be taxed very differently than a corporation that
only has seventy-nine percent of its stock owned by another corporation. Consolidated return
filing is available in the former situation but not in the latter. I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) (setting a
clear eighty percent threshold). This is true even though there is not a large difference between
eighty-one percent and seventy-nine percent ownership.
.2 Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelism
and Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGs L.J. 645, 650 (2006). Compare Louis Kaplow, A Note on
Horizontal Equity, I FLA. TAx REv. 191 (1992) (arguing that the concept of horizontal equity
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election to reconcile discontinuous tax regimes must deal with the issue of
defining similarity, perhaps by focusing on those situations where the dis-
continuity creates significantly problematic behavioral responses. That is,
discontinuities in need of reconciliation may be identified by focusing on
situations where significant deadweight loss is created as a result of changes
in behavior by taxpayers responding to the tax discontinuity." 3 Ultimately,
an explicit election should be considered as a tool for mitigating a disconti-
nuity only when policymakers determine that two situations are sufficiently
similar so that equity, neutrality, and efficiency are served by allowing those
situations to be taxed in similar manners.
2. Can the Discontinuity Be Eliminated Rather Than Merely
Reconciled?
If a discontinuity in the tax regime is sufficiently problematic from an
equity, neutrality, or efficiency perspective that an explicit election is con-
sidered as a possible solution, perhaps the discontinuity should be eliminated
rather than merely reconciled. A discontinuity can be eliminated by chang-
ing the underlying tax laws so that multiple different tax regimes no longer
apply to substantively similar economic transactions. For example, the dis-
continuity between asset sales and stock sales could be eliminated if the
corporate tax system were fully integrated. Under a fully integrated system,
shareholders would be taxed directly regardless of whether the sale of a bus-
iness was structured as an asset sale or stock sale. 114 However, changing the
tax laws to eliminate discontinuity typically requires major systemic
change," 5 which can be difficult to accomplish even if many leading schol-
is simply a version of the notion of vertical equity), with Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal
Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990).
H3 See infra Part 1II.A (discussing how taxpayers take advantage of discontinuities in the
tax law by making implicit choices).
" 4 See generally U.S. DEPF OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM
(1977). Full corporate integration refers to the adoption of a comprehensive system that
merges the individual and corporate tax regimes such that the income of a corporation would
be taxed only once at the shareholder level. See generally U.S. DEP OF THE TREASURY, RE-
PORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS
INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT].
I" For example, discontinuity between the sale of a corporation's stock and the sale of a
corporation's assets arises because of the two levels of tax (corporate level and shareholder
level) that apply to corporate income. Upon the sale of a corporation's assets, the corporation is
taxed on its gain and, if the corporation distributes the proceeds to the shareholders, the share-
holders will also be taxed. In contrast, upon the sale of corporate stock, only the shareholders
are taxed; no corporate level tax is imposed when corporate stock is sold. Thus, the existence
of corporate double taxation creates discontinuity between the tax treatments of these forms
for selling a business. In order to eliminate the discontinuity, the double tax on corporations
could be eliminated and replaced with a system that taxes corporate income once, directly at
the shareholder level. This is the essence of full corporate integration. See TREASURY INTEGRA-
TION REPORT, supra note 114. Of course, the adoption of such a system would be a fairly
radical departure from our existing regimes for taxing business entities, which have applied for
decades. Moreover, such a change would affect much more than the treatment of asset sales
2010]
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ars support the change." 6 Nevertheless, before an explicit election is used to
mitigate the impact of discontinuous tax regimes, an inquiry should be made
as to whether the discontinuity can and should be eliminated by changing the
underlying tax regimes.
Even if the underlying tax regimes are unlikely to be modified, a dis-
continuity can be eliminated with a less drastic change by making the elec-
tive treatment mandatory. For example, in 2004, Congress made inside basis
adjustments mandatory, rather than elective, upon the purchase of interests
in a partnership with a substantial built-in loss."' This change requires that,
for inside basis purposes, certain purchases of partnership interests be treated
like purchases of the partnership's assets."8 In order to remedy the treatment
discontinuity between purchases of partnership interests and purchases of the
underlying partnership assets, this change could be extended to require in-
side basis adjustments upon all purchases of partnership interests. Similarly,
§ 338, which is now generally elective," 9 could be made mandatory; all
qualified stock purchases could be required to be treated as asset purchases,
thereby eliminating much of the discontinuity between asset and stock
purchases without fundamentally altering the current corporate tax system.20
In addition to dealing with discontinuities, mandatory treatment avoids
many of the policy criticisms of elections. For example, with mandatory
treatment, taxpayers are relieved from having to decide whether or not to
make an election and from having to determine how and when to make the
election. Further, both the IRS and the taxpayers avoid dealing with late
elections or revoking unwise elections. This could promote administrability,
reduce waste of resources, and increase revenue.
and stock sales; it would also change the way in which business operations, contributions,
distributions, and restructurings are treated for tax purposes.
116 For example, over the last thirty years, many scholars have called for some degree of
corporate integration, but Congress has not heeded these calls, although the impact of the
double tax has been mitigated with the reduction in tax rates on qualified dividends. See, e.g.,
A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
INCOME TAXES (1993) (Alvin C. Warren, Jr., rep.); TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra
note 114; Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Integration of Corporate and Individual
Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAx NOTEs 1767 (1999); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integra-
tion of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform
Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975).
" American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833(b), 118 Stat. 1418,
1589-91 (2004) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 743(a) (2006)).
,, I.R.C. § 743(a), (b) (2006).
9 The consistency rules of subsections (e) and (f) of § 338 provide a relatively narrow
exception to the elective nature of § 338. I.R.C. § 338(e), (f) (2006).
2 This approach eliminates the discontinuity between asset sales and stock sales where
the sale involves eighty percent or more of the corporation's value. Id. § 338(d)(3)(2006) (pro-
viding that § 338 applies only where there is a purchase of eighty percent or more of the vote
and value of the target corporation). Note, however, that making the § 338 election mandatory
does nothing to eliminate the discontinuity between smaller asset sales and stock sales. Elimi-
nating the discontinuity between these smaller asset and stock sales would require more funda-
mental change in the corporate tax system. See supra note 115.
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However, mandatory treatment could have a variety of adverse conse-
quences. For example, extending mandatory § 743 inside basis adjustments
to all purchases of partnership interests may be undesirable because inside
basis adjustments can be very complex to make 12' and because retention of
the elective approach allows taxpayers to gauge whether the benefits of the
election-here, inside basis adjustments-outweigh the costs and complex-
ity of making the election. Additionally, efforts to eliminate discontinuities
by making elective treatment mandatory could just create other discontinui-
ties. For example, if the § 338 treatment (i.e., asset sale treatment for "quali-
fied stock purchases") 122 is made mandatory, 123 then a purchase of eighty-
one percent of the stock of a target corporation would be taxed very differ-
ently than the purchase of seventy-nine percent of the stock of a target cor-
poration. 24 Further, as with consolidated filing, which was originally
required 25 but then made elective, 26 there may be value in allowing taxpay-
121 See generally McKEE ET AL., supra note 98.
122 I.R.C. § 338(d)(3) (defining "qualified stock purchase" to be a transaction or series of
transactions in which eighty percent or more of the stock of a target corporation is purchased
within a twelve-month period).
123 Additionally, an effort to make § 338 mandatory would likely face significant opposi-
tion from taxpayers because a stock sale (without a regular § 338 election) is subject to only
one level of current tax (measured based on the gain inherent in the stock), but a stock sale
with a regular § 338 election generally results in the imposition of two levels of current tax on
the transaction (tax on the actual stock sale and tax on the deemed asset sale). Id. § 338(a)
(2006). Thus, regular § 338 elections are generally not taxpayer favorable, except in limited
situations. See generally GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 79. In contrast, § 338(h)(10) elections
are commonly desirable when taxpayers are eligible for such an election (i.e., where the target
corporation is an S corporation or is a member of an affiliated or consolidated group). I.R.C.
§ 338(h)(10)(A) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-l(c) (as amended in 2007). This is because
a stock sale with a § 338(h)(10) election generally results in the imposition of only one level of
current tax (measured based on the gain built into the target's assets), while still providing cost
basis in the post-transaction assets. I.R.C. § 338(h)(10)(A) (treating the target as if it had sold
its assets and disregarding the actual stock sale). Nevertheless, to the extent taxpayers may
value the flexibility and freedom to choose whether or not § 338(h)(10) applies, taxpayers may
lobby against making even the § 338(h)(10) election mandatory.
12' Of course, this same type of discontinuity will still exist even if the treatment remains
elective, as long as there is a threshold above which an election can be made and below which
an election cannot be made. See supra note I ll. As a result, policymakers should be very
careful when selecting eligibility requirements for elections. See infra Part IV.B (explaining
that any eligibility requirements for elections can create discontinuities and discussing how to
define eligibility limitations for elections). Even where eligibility requirements for elections
create discontinuities, the availability of an election can mitigate the stark consequences of
existence of a bright line. For example, under mandatory § 338 treatment, the purchase of
eighty-one percent of the stock of a target would be taxed differently than the purchase of
seventy-nine percent of the stock of a target, but where § 338 is elective, the purchase of
eighty-one percent of the stock of a target might be taxed differently than, but also might be
taxed in the same way as, the purchase of seventy-nine percent of the stock of a target. Thus,
despite the existence of discontinuities even when there are elections, an elective approach
may afford taxpayers flexibility in structuring their transactions in a manner that is optimal for
non-tax purposes. In turn, the use of elections to reconcile discontinuities in the tax law may
reduce the severity of the inefficiencies and inequities created by those discontinuities.
2 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 240, 40 Stat. 1057, 1081-82 (1919) (current version at
I.R.C. § 1501 (2006)) (extending mandatory consolidated group filing to the corporate income
tax).
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ers to have the flexibility to be treated in a way that reflects the economic
realities of their businesses.2 7 Nevertheless, if a discontinuity is sufficiently
problematic that an explicit election is used (or is being considered) to miti-
gate the impact of the discontinuity, the policy objectives served by the elec-
tion may be even better served by mandating the treatment that reconciles
the discontinuity. This possibility should be fully explored before accepting
an explicit election as a solution to the discontinuity.
3. Should Discontinuity-Reconciling Explicit Elections Be
Unidirectional?
Assuming that a discontinuity should be reconciled but cannot be elimi-
nated and that an explicit election is used to reconcile the discontinuity,
a key feature of the election that must be determined is the election's direc-
tionality. The implicit choice'28 presented by the mere existence of a dis-
continuity is inherently multidirectional. For example, a taxpayer who might
otherwise undertake a stock purchase can restructure the transaction as an
asset purchase in order for the transaction to be taxed as an asset purchase,
and vice versa. However, when the Code provides explicit choices that deal
with tax discontinuities, these elections are generally unidirectional. For ex-
ample, a § 338 election allows stock purchases to be treated as asset
purchases, but there is no explicit election that enables asset purchases to be
treated as stock purchases. Similarly, an election under § 1501 allows multi-
ple related corporations to be treated as a single economic unit, but there is
no explicit election that allows multiple economic units operated within a
single corporation to be taxed as multiple separate corporations. In contrast,
the author has proposed a multidirectional explicit election for partnership
mergers, divisions, and incorporations. 2 9 For example, there are three basic
forms for incorporation of a partnership-"assets-over," "assets-up," and
"interests-over" 30 -and the proposal would allow a partnership incorpora-
26 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240, 42 Stat. 227, 260 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 1501) (making consolidated filing elective).
127 See WHITE, supra note 83, at A-37 (noting that Congress adopted an elective approach
to consolidated filing in order to provide business owners with the flexibility to have their
businesses taxed in accordance with economic realities).
I28 See supra Part III.A (discussing how discontinuous tax regimes provide taxpayers with
an implicit choice: the ability to make a choice among the tax regimes by structuring their
economic affairs in a particular manner).
129 See Field, supra note 20.
130 To incorporate using the "assets-over" form, the partnership contributes all of its assets
over to the newly formed corporation in exchange for stock in the corporation and the corpora-
tion's assumption of the partnership's liabilities, and then the partnership distributes the stock
to the partners in liquidation of the partnership. To incorporate using the "assets-up" form, the
partnership distributes all of its assets and liabilities up to its partners in liquidation, and then
the partners contribute the assets to the newly formed corporation in exchange for stock in the
corporation and assumption of the liabilities that had been assumed by the partners. To incor-
porate using the "interests-over" form, the partners contribute their partnership interests to a
newly formed corporation in exchange for stock in the corporation. See id. at 273-78 (describ-
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tion undertaken in an "assets-over" form to elect to be taxed as an incorpo-
ration undertaken as an "assets-up" or "interests-over" transaction, and vice
versa. 131
An explicit election should respond to the problems created by the dis-
continuity. If either the tax consequences or the non-tax business factors
push very strongly in favor of one form of transaction only, then the behav-
ioral bias of the tax law runs primarily in one direction only'32 and only a
unidirectional election is needed to counter that bias. For example, the
§ 338(h)(10) election involves tax factors that weigh very heavily in favor of
one form. When a buyer corporation wants to acquire a subsidiary of a par-
ent corporation, the buyer generally has a very strong tax-motivated prefer-
ence in favor of an acquisition that is taxed as an asset acquisition rather
than as a stock acquisition.'33 Thus, the discontinuity between the tax treat-
ment of asset purchases and stock purchases creates a behavioral incentive
ing the different ways to undertake incorporations and explaining the tax treatment of each);
see also Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88 (same). Some state laws also allow partnerships to
undertake a formless incorporation, and the tax law treats such incorporations as "assets-over"
transactions. Rev. Rul. 2004-59, 2004-1 C.B. 1050.
' See Field, supra note 20, at 296-97. The proposal would also allow a similar multi-
directional election for partnership mergers and divisions:
Taxpayers would implement the form of merger, division, or incorporation most
preferable from a business perspective. Regardless of the form of transaction chosen,
the entities involved in the transaction could elect which construct would apply to
the transaction for federal income tax purposes. For incorporations and mergers, the
parties would choose among the assets-over, assets-up, and interests-over constructs;
for divisions they would choose between the assets-over and assets-up constructs.
ld.
,32 Assume two transaction forms (Form A and Form B) that are taxed differently (under
Regime A and Regime B). The tax law bias can favor Form A or Form B, or the tax law bias
can depend on the facts and circumstances of the situation. Similarly, non-tax business factors
can favor Form A or Form B, or the business bias can depend on the facts and circumstances.
Where the business bias and the tax bias both point strongly in the same direction, there may
be few neutrality and efficiency problems with the discontinuity, so no explicit election may be
needed. Where the tax bias points in one direction (for example, toward Form A), and the
business bias points in either the other direction (toward Form B) or is dependent on the facts
and circumstances, a unidirectional election (that allows transactions undertaken in Form B,
the possibly favored business form, to be taxed as if they were undertaken in Form A, the
favored tax treatment) solves the problem. Similarly, where the business bias points in one
direction (for example, toward Form B), and the tax bias points in either the other direction
(toward Form A) or is dependent on the facts and circumstances, again, a unidirectional elec-
tion (that allows transactions undertaken in Form B, the favored business form, to be taxed as
if they were undertaken in Form A, the possibly favored tax treatment) solves the problem.
Only where both the tax bias and the business bias are unclear and dependent on the facts and
circumstances of the particular situation is a multidirectional election (where transactions un-
dertaken in Form A can be taxed as if they were undertaken in Form B, and vice versa) needed
to address the neutrality and efficiency problems of taxpayers restructuring their transactions
in response to the tax and business incentives.
"' See generally GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 79, 206.1.2. However, the tax conse-
quences of the transaction to the seller may cause the selling corporation to have exactly the
opposite preference depending on the difference between the target company's inside basis and
outside basis. See id. Nevertheless, the overall tax bias generally favors a transaction that is
taxed as an asset sale because a transaction that is taxed as a stock sale could ultimately be
subject to an extra layer of tax. See id.
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for the buyer to try to structure the transaction so that it will be taxed as an
asset purchase, even if a stock purchase would be more desirable from a
non-tax business perspective. To reduce this behavioral influence of the tax
law and, thereby, mitigate the impact of the discontinuity, all that is needed
is a unidirectional explicit election that allows the stock purchase to be
treated as an asset purchase; hence, the § 338(h)(10) election is
unidirectional.
Further, the election to file as a consolidated group involves the impact
of non-tax business factors that push strongly in one direction. Non-tax busi-
ness factors commonly encourage a business to segregate portions of its op-
erations into different wholly-owned corporations. However, the
discontinuity in the tax regimes can encourage taxpayers to keep the entire
business operating in a single corporate entity even if that is suboptimal
from a business perspective. To reduce this behavioral influence of the tax
law and mitigate the impact of the discontinuity, only a unidirectional elec-
tion (whereby a group of separate corporations can choose to be treated as a
single corporation) is needed. This is because a business that desires separate
treatment for different aspects of its operations can obtain that tax treatment
fairly easily through self-help, merely by segregating those operations into
different subsidiary corporations. Thus, only an election in the opposite di-
rection is needed to address the problems created by the tax discontinuity.
However, if neither the tax consequences nor the non-tax business fac-
tors weigh heavily in favor of one form of transaction or another, a multi-
directional election may be needed. Where both the tax incentives and non-
tax incentives regularly vary depending on the facts and circumstances, the
behavioral impact of the discontinuity in the tax law can run in multiple
directions. In such a case, in order to mitigate the impact of the discontinu-
ous tax regimes, an election should allow the taxpayer to choose among
multiple possible tax treatments, regardless of the actual form of transaction.
B. Facilitating Tax Classification
In addition to reconciling discontinuous tax regimes, explicit tax elec-
tions can also facilitate tax classification. The tax law regularly requires that
a set of facts be classified into one tax category or another (for example,
distinguishing debt from equity,' 34 employees from independent contrac-
tors, "'35 and capital expenditures from immediately deductible expenses'36).
134 I.R.C. § 385 (2006) (authorizing the IRS to promulgate regulations for distinguishing
debt from equity); see also Plumb, supra note 72 (the seminal work on distinguishing debt
from equity for tax purposes).
135 Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (articulating factors for distinguishing employees
from independent contractors for tax purposes); see also HELEN E. MARMOLL, EMPLOYMENT
STATUS - EMPLOYEE V. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR (Tax Mgmt. 2001) (discussing in detail the
tax distinction between employees and independent contractors).
136 Compare I.R.C. § 162 (2006) (allowing the immediate deduction of certain expenses),
with § 263 (2006) (requiring that capital expenditures be capitalized and not currently de-
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The tax consequences can vary dramatically depending on these classifica-
tions.'37 Each such classification question presents a discontinuity in the tax
law, but in contrast to the discontinuity problems discussed in Part III.A
(where different tax regimes apply to economically similar but clearly for-
mally distinct transactions), classification questions present discontinuities
in the tax law in the absence of clear formal distinctions between the rele-
vant factual scenarios.'38 That is, classification questions involve situations
where it can be particularly difficult to determine where one discontinuous
tax category ends and another begins. This difficulty occurs because there is
a virtually continuous array of factual situations between two endpoints. 39
ducted); see also JAMES EDWARD MAULE, DEDUCTION LIMITATIONS: GENERAL pt. IV (Tax
Mgmt. 2000) (discussing the capitalization requirements as a limitation on the deductibility of
expenditures).
137 For example, interest payments on a financial instrument that is classified as debt are
generally deductible by the payor, but dividend payments on a financial instrument that is
classified as equity are not deductible by the payor. See I.R.C. § 163 (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
This is true even though the instruments may provide very similar economic and legal rights.
"I The discontinuities addressed in Parts III.A and III.B differ in important respects, and
thus elections dealing with those discontinuities serve different functions. Part III.A involves
discrete factual scenarios to which the discontinuous tax regimes could apply, and it is per-
fectly clear which tax regime applies to the particular situation; there is no balancing of facts
and circumstances and no judgment call required to categorize a particular set of facts. The
function of the election is to allow one set of factual scenarios to be taxed as if it were another.
In contrast, this Part involves virtually continuous arrays of factual situations between two
fixed endpoints, where it can be difficult to determine where the application of one tax regime
should end and the application of the other tax regime should begin. In these situations, the
function of the election is to differentiate between the sets of factual scenarios. Nevertheless,
particularly at the endpoints of the continuous array of factual scenarios where it may be
reasonably clear how to classify the particular scenario, an election that facilitates classifica-
tion may also serve an additional purpose of reconciling the discontinuous tax regimes. For
example, the American Law Institute's ("ALI") proposed reorganization election discussed
herein may serve both the purpose of facilitating tax classification (for those situations in the
middle of the continuous array of factual scenarios, where it is difficult to substantively iden-
tify whether the transaction should be treated as a carryover basis or cost-basis transaction) and
the purpose of reconciling discontinuous tax regimes (for those situations at the far endpoints
of the array of factual scenarios, where it may be somewhat clearer which tax regime should
apply and where the election could help to soften the harshness of the difference between the
tax regimes that treat some corporate acquisitions as taxable cost-basis transactions and other
corporate acquisitions as nontaxable carryover basis transactions). See infra notes 144-146 and
accompanying text.
'139 For example, consider the debt/equity distinction. Common stock in a corporation is
clearly equity, and a plain vanilla note-i.e., with a short fixed term, market rate interest
payable in cash at least annually, no subordination or conversion rights, etc-is clearly debt.
These are the endpoints of the equity/debt array-i.e., the extreme examples where it is very
easy to classify a factual situation into one category or another. However, there are a huge
number of possible combinations of rights that an interestholder may have. As an interest
deviates from the extreme examples, it moves farther down the line toward the other end. For
example, if, rather than common stock, a holder owns preferred stock, entitling the holder to
preferred dividends and a preferred but capped amount payable to the holder upon liquidation,
this interest is somewhat more debt-like than common stock and is slightly more toward the
middle of the debt/equity array. Ultimately, all of the financial interests have to be classified as
debt or equity, but the challenge in making that classification is determining where one cate-
gory ends and the other begins.
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Most classification determinations depend on the substance of the situa-
tion and require careful analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances,
often using multi-factored tests. 40 Alternatively, a classification determina-
tion can be made using an explicit election. For example, the entity classifi-
cation election provided under Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-3
(commonly called the check-the-box election) allows most unincorporated
business entities to elect whether to be taxed as corporations or as pass-
through entities.' 4' This explicit election for entity classification replaced a
prior multi-factored test, which tried to measure the extent to which the en-
tity resembled a corporation. 42 The adoption of an explicitly elective ap-
proach to entity classification was made because of the Service's
acknowledgement that:
[M]any states recently have revised their statutes to provide that
partnerships and other unincorporated organizations may possess
characteristics that have traditionally been associated with corpo-
rations, thereby narrowing considerably the traditional distinctions
between corporations and partnerships. . . . One consequence of
the narrowing of the differences under local law between corpora-
tions and partnerships is that taxpayers can achieve partnership tax
classification for a non-publicly traded organization that, in all
meaningful respects, is virtually indistinguishable from a
corporation. 14
That is, the convergence of the characteristics of different types of business
entities made it at best formalistic, and at worst futile, to try to use substan-
tive facts and circumstances to classify businesses as corporations or as part-
nerships for tax purposes.
Another example of classification by election is the American Law In-
stitute's ("ALl") proposed explicit election that would allow corporate ac-
quisitions to be treated, at the option of the acquirer and target, as nontaxable
carryover basis transactions or taxable cost basis transactions (hereinafter
"the ALI's proposed reorganization election").' 44 The ALl explained that
140 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 385 (2006) (authorizing regulations setting forth factors that enable
debt and equity to be distinguished from each other); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-I to -5 (2004)
(providing guidance for distinguishing currently deductible expenses from capital expendi-
tures); Plumb, supra note 72 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the factors that distin-
guish debt from equity).
'14 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006). See generally Field, supra note 10, at
463-70 (providing a detailed description of the operation of the check-the-box regulations).
142 See Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935) (explaining that the key issue in
distinguishing corporations from partnerships is corporate resemblance); Former Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a) (1960) (making it more difficult to achieve corporate status under the corpo-
rate resemblance test).
141 I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
' A.L.I., FEDERAL INCoME TAX PROJECT: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND
DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 24-50 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter A.L.I. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION ELECTION] (William D. Andrews, rep.). The ALI's pro-
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"the reorganization definition was frequently uncertain in its definition" and
that "the search for substantive differences among acquisitions by which to
determine their tax classification has been essentially fruitless." 145 Thus, the
ALl advocated for an explicit election approach, which divorced tax classifi-
cation from corporate procedural choices.146 Accordingly, explicit elections,
like the check-the-box election and the ALI's proposed reorganization elec-
tion, enable the tax classification of business entities and transactions, re-
spectively, without giving rise to the horizontal inequity created by drawing
arbitrary lines between types of factual scenarios with no meaningful
differences.
Thus, an explicit election may be a simple and efficient approach to an
otherwise difficult and costly exercise in line drawing, particularly where
there is a largely continuous range of similar factual situations. An explicit
election may be the way to differentiate between situations to which Regime
A applies and to which Regime B applies while creating the least amount of
deadweight loss. 147 On this measure, Professor David Weisbach praised the
Service's choice to replace the multi-factor corporate resemblance test with
the elective check-the-box regulations because it "drop[s] traditional con-
cerns and instead focus[es] on efficiency."'' 48 Using an explicit election for
entity classification may be efficiency-enhancing because the availability of
an explicit choice frees taxpayers from the burden of having to make an
implicit choice, whereby the taxpayer would structure a transaction in a pos-
sibly suboptimal manner in order to achieve a desired tax treatment. For
example, under the check-the-box regulations, taxpayers have become free
to choose the combination of management, liability, interest transferability,
and continuity of life terms that are optimal for the business, without being
influenced by the tax implications of including those terms.
In addition to possible equity and efficiency enhancements, using ex-
plicit elections for classification purposes has the potential to confer addi-
tional benefits. 49 Explicit elections can simplify the classification process
for taxpayers by eliminating the detailed inquiry required by a facts and
posed corporate reorganization election was never adopted. Moreover, since the ALI's
proposal (published in tentative form in 1977 and published in final form in 1982), the defini-
tion of "reorganization" has been refined through the modification of Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1
and through the issuance of various IRS documents, so there are fewer definition problems
with identifying transactions that qualify as reorganizations. See, e.g., T.D. 8760, 1998-1 C.B.
803; T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134. These developments in the law may weaken the arguments
in favor of an election like the proposed reorganization election. Nevertheless, it was proposed
as, and can help demonstrate the potential role of, a classification election.
14' A.L.I. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION ELECTION, supra note 144, at 24, 28, 35 (also ex-
plaining, among other things, that existing law regarding reorganizations "contain[ed] a very
intricate scheme of classification of acquisition transactions, some of whose boundary lines
raise continuing, difficult, definitional problems").
146 Id. at 24-50.
... See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 68.
1
48 Id. at 1630.
149 See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 471-73, 480-87 (discussing the policy benefits cre-
ated as a result of the adoption of the check-the-box election).
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circumstances test. Elections can also confer corresponding administrability
benefits on the Service. 50 In addition, classification via an explicit election
increases taxpayer certainty regarding a desired classification-taxpayers
need not rely on a judgment made after weighing facts and circumstances,
which might put them in tenuous positions in close cases. Moreover, an ex-
plicit election can reduce the premium that facts and circumstances tests
place on taxpayer knowledge, sophistication, and ability to obtain expensive
advice.
Notwithstanding the foregoing potential benefits of using explicit elec-
tions for classification purposes, the check-the-box election, while worthy of
praise, has not achieved all of these benefits, 5' and the success of the pro-
posed ALl reorganization election cannot be evaluated because it was never
adopted. It is therefore difficult to assess the potential success of other ex-
plicit classification elections. Even where the use of explicit elections for
classification purposes could be designed so as to accomplish the above-
described policy objectives, classification elections raise a number of
issues.'52
1. When Do Substance-Based Classification Tests Cease to Be
Meaningful or Useful?
The argument that explicit elections are useful for classifying factual
scenarios that are "virtually indistinguishable" suffers because of the need
to determine which factual differences have tax import and which differ-
ences are meaningless for tax purposes. 153 For example, the check-the-box
regulations, together with the statutory definition of "corporation,"'
154 sug-
gest that features like limited liability are not important for determining
whether a domestic' 55 business entity should be taxed as a corporation or as a
150 For example, when the check-the-box regulations replaced the corporate resemblance
test for purposes of classifying business entities, the IRS was "relieved from having to inquire
into the specific state law rights and responsibilities of the entity and its members and from
having to examine the specific terms included in the entity's operating agreement." Id. at 473.
This change meant that the IRS could more easily, and with fewer resources, determine which
entities are corporations and which entities are partnerships for tax purposes.
' See id. at 495-96 (concluding that the check-the-box regulations fall short of their
promise because of difficulties in the application of the check-the-box regulations to foreign
entities and because the regulations do not eliminate the multi-regime system for taxing busi-
nesses, among other reasons).
52 This discussion focuses only on the criticisms relating exclusively to the use of explicit
elections for classification purposes. General criticisms of the use of explicit elections are
discussed in Part II, supra.
... It is important to distinguish between legal and economic distinctions that lack signifi-
cance, on one hand, and legal and economic distinctions that are significant but that are diffi-
cult to identify.
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2006).
'5 But see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (as amended in 2006) (providing that the default
classification for foreign entities depends in part on whether the owners of the foreign entity
have unlimited liability for the business's debts).
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pass-through entity. 15 6 However, incorporation under state or federal law is
important for tax purposes. 15 7 Commentators continue to debate whether lim-
ited liability, incorporation under state or federal law, and other features of
business entities should impact tax classification.
58
Similarly, in proposing its reorganization election, the ALl argued that
differences in "corporate procedure" should not result in different tax treat-
ment for transactions with similar "financial import."'' 5 9 Thus, the ALl con-
cluded that, "at least in the case of a complete acquisition of all interests in
all assets in another corporation, there are not substantive differences among
forms of transactions sufficient to explain or justify the difference between
carryover and cost-basis treatment."' 16°
Ultimately, these debates are just specific instances of the greater, com-
monly discussed, theoretical question about how similarity and difference
are determined.' 61 This issue of meaningful difference 162 may help explain
why explicit elections are not used more commonly in classification deter-
minations. When there is tax importance to the differences between two pos-
sible classifications of a particular set of facts, allowing the tax classification
to be determined solely by the taxpayer may be inequitable and may lead to
abuse. For example, even though it is often difficult to distinguish between
capital expenditures and immediately deductible expenditures, 63 they are
156 The Treasury considered, but explicitly rejected, the use of limited liability as a key
factor in distinguishing corporations from flow-through entities. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75, 709
(Nov. 17, 1980) (proposing regulations that provided that "an organization in which no mem-
ber has personal liability for the debts of the organization be classified as an association taxa-
ble as a corporation"); I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31 (withdrawing the
proposed regulations). But see Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation:
A Critique of the ALl Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U.
PIr. L. REV. 223 (2000) (arguing in favor of determining tax classification based on limited
liability).
117 The treatment of incorporated entities as corporations for tax purposes is reflected in
the statute itself, while most of the other entity classification rules are in the regulations.
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3).
"5 8 See, e.g., A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES 55-56 (1999) [hereinafter A.L.I. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE STUDY] (George K. Yin &
David J. Shakow, reps.); Maine, supra note 156.
1
59 A.L.I. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION ELECTION, supra note 144, at 35.
160 Id.
161 See supra Part III.A.I.
162 It is left to the reader, and to any legislator or administrator proposing a classification
election, to define "tax equals" in any particular situation. This Article does not attempt to
explore the philosophical arguments about what makes factual scenarios "same" or "differ-
ent" for tax purposes. Rather, this discussion is intended to highlight the point that the propri-
ety of using an explicit election for a particular classification problem may turn, at least in part,
on the extent to which the factual situations that could be subject to the election are sufficiently
similar.
163 See, e.g., J. Aaron Ball, A Merger Mystery: Outlining a Legislative Solution for the
Problem of Distinguishing Deductible Expenses from Capital Expenditures Discussed in Wells
Fargo v. Commissioner, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 55, 57-77 (2001) (discussing the difficulty in
distinguishing capital expenditures from immediately deductible expenses); John Lee et al.,
Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part
One), 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 631 (1997).
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considered fundamentally different because capital expenditures generally
create or enhance "separate and distinct assets"'1 4 or confer "significant
long-term benefits,"'65 while immediately deductible expenditures generally
do not. Capitalization prevents an immediate deduction because the taxpayer
is not poorer; the taxpayer's wealth is just in the form of an asset rather than
cash. This difference is meaningful for tax purposes because allowing the
immediate deduction of capital expenditures would allow "distortion of tax-
able income through current deduction of expenditures relating to the pro-
duction of income in future years."' 6 6 Taxpayers would likely try to exploit
this distortion if they were allowed to elect how their expenditures were
classified. Hence, this classification is an unlikely candidate for an explicit
election.
2. Can the Need for Classification Be Eliminated?
Even where the differences between potential classifications are not
meaningful for tax purposes, or where an election may be the most efficient
classification method, allowing taxpayers to choose among the classifica-
tions may exacerbate rather than solve the classification problem. For exam-
ple, some commentators have argued that the traditional differences between
equity and debt have eroded over time with the development of new theories
of the firm and that "[t]he recent explosion in financial contract innovation
has laid bare the deficiencies of the debt-equity distinction."'' 67 Nevertheless,
given Congress's efforts to police the debt-equity line, 68 and given concern
over financial products that exploit the differences between the tax treatment
of debt and equity, 69 allowing taxpayers to choose between debt and equity
64 Comm'r v. Lincoln Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
165 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); see also Preamble to Proposed Regu-
lations, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,701, 77,702 (Dec. 19, 2001); cf Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4, -5 (2004)
(pulling back on the "significant future benefits" formulation of the capitalization test, but
identifying a number of specific categories of capitalizable expenditures, some of which are
informed by the future benefit standard).
" Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. at 77,702. But see Deborah A. Geier,
The Myth of Matching as a Tax Value, 15 AM. J. TAX POL'v 17 (1998) (arguing that, for tax
purposes, capitalization is not dependent on the principle of matching the timing of the deduc-
tion of expenditures and the inclusion of the income to which the expenditures relate).
167 Pratt, supra note 72, at 1057, 1072-88; see also Adam 0. Emmerich, Hybrid Instru-
ments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 118 (1985).
But see Hideki Kanda, Debtholders and Equityholders, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (1992) (arguing
that the economic natures of debt and equity differ).
168 See I.R.C. § 163(l) (2006) (enacted in 1997 to deny an interest deduction for interest
payable in equity); id. § 385 (2006) (asking the Treasury to promulgate regulations distinguish-
ing debt from equity). See generally Richard J. Kovach, The Janus-Like Nature of Treasury
Regulations: Recent Promulgations Illustrate How Regulators Can Simplify as Well as Com-
plicate Administration of the Internal Revenue Code, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 99-101 (2002)
(describing the IRS's failed effort to promulgate regulations under § 385).
'6 See, e.g., Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology
Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 859, 861 (2002).
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classification may be tantamount to an admission of defeat. 170 Instead, the
better response may be to recognize that an explicit election is really only a
second-best solution, if that, to any classification question. Thus, particularly
where the facts are virtually indistinguishable (at least the facts that are im-
portant for tax purposes), it might be better to abolish the distinction among
the categories.' 7'
Any method for drawing a line inherently assumes the defensibility of
the categories on either side of the line. 7 2 For example, in proposing the
reorganization election, the ALl affirmatively argued in favor of retaining
both the carryover basis and cost-basis modes of treating corporate acquisi-
tions. "'73 However, as Professor Weisbach noted, "[eiven the most enlight-
ened line drawing cannot solve the central problem with the distinction."'
174
Thus, absent an argument explaining the distinction between the relevant tax
regimes, a fairer, simpler, and more neutral solution would be to make clas-
sification irrelevant by imposing the same tax treatment regardless of classi-
fication. As numerous commentators have concluded, taxing debt and equity
alike eliminates the classification question and removes the tax bias imposed
on taxpayers' choices regarding how to raise capital.
75
Nevertheless, eliminating dichotomies like the debt-equity distinction
and the distinction between corporations and partnerships requires funda-
mental change in the tax law. Thus, short of that major change, an explicit
election may be a useful tool for classification in the limited situations where
the election is designed to most fully achieve the potential benefits, where
the legal and economic distinctions between the sets of facts lack signifi-
cance for tax purposes, and where the disadvantages to using explicit elec-
tions 176 do not outweigh the benefits.
C. Advancing Simplicity & Administrability
A significant number of elections confer primarily simplicity and ad-
ministrative benefits. For example, a taxpayer's ability to choose between
170 This is a version of the deregulation argument against the use of explicit elections in
general. See Dean, supra note 65. But see Samuel D. Brunson, Elective Taxation of Risk-Based
Financial Instruments: A Proposal, 8 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 1 (2007) (proposing that taxpay-
ers be able to elect which of two tax treatments apply to their financial instruments).
71 See Dean, supra note 65.
'7' That is, Regime A and Regime B are each appropriate ways to tax the situations to
which they apply, and the situations to which Regime A applies are sufficiently different from
the situations to which Regime B applies, so as to justify different tax treatment.
' A.L.I. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION ELECTION, supra note 144, at 39-41.
174 David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes: A Response to Professor
Schlunk, 80 TEX. L. REV. 893 (2002); see also Plumb, supra note 72, at 691 (explaining this
problem by referencing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2 ("The fault, dear
Brutus, is not in our definition but in our dichotomy.")).
See, e.g., Plumb supra note 72; Pratt, supra note 72; TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT,
supra note 114, at 17-60.
1
76 See supra Part II.
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taking the standard deduction and taking itemized deductions is, very funda-
mentally, an election intended to provide simplicity-the availability of the
standard deduction relieves a taxpayer from having to keep track of all of his
itemizable deductions. 177 Similarly, in the partnership tax context, complying
with all of Subchapter K may be unwieldy and expensive for partnerships
with a lot of members;7 8 § 771 allows such partnerships to elect out of the
regular Subchapter K regime and into a modified version of the partnership
tax regime that reduces the reporting and audit burdens on both the partner-
ships and the Service.
79
Many accounting elections fall into this category. For example, taxpay-
ers who use a financial accounting period that varies from fifty-two to fifty-
three weeks can elect to use that same accounting period for tax purposes as
well. 80 This election simplifies the taxpayer's tax and financial bookkeeping
requirements.' Additionally, some elections bind the taxpayer to apply the
same treatment to all items within a single year, 82 and some require the
taxpayer to continue the same treatment from year to year unless the Service
consents to change.'83 These obligations provide an administrative benefit
because taxpayers commit to consistency in reporting, which minimizes the
risk that taxpayers will be able to distort their incomes or whipsaw the gov-
emnment by taking different approaches to accounting issues within a year or
from year to year. Thus, especially where changes in a taxpayer's choice can
result in distortion of income, consideration should be given to the possibil-
ity of making the election effective not only for the year in which the elec-
tion is made, but for the long term.
It should be noted that some simplifying elections also have the impact
of reducing the taxpayer's tax burden, or at least deferring the taxpayer's
obligation to pay tax, thus providing the taxpayer with the time value of
money. In these situations, the Code sometimes imposes a charge on the
taxpayer in exchange for the right to avail himself of the simpler approach.
For example, an entity can elect to use a taxable year that results in up to
three months of deferral, but it must make certain payments that are de-
signed to eliminate the benefit of the deferral.1' 4 Additionally, certain tax-
payers opting to defer the inclusion of a significant amount of income under
'71 S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969).
178 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF T1E
TAX SIMPLIFICATION AcT OF 1993 55-56 (Comm. Print 1993) (discussing the hardships that
confront large partnerships).
179 I.R.C. §§ 771-777 (2006).
'
80 Id. § 441(0 (2006).
181 Id.
812 See, e.g., id. § 446 (2006) (chosen accounting method applies to all tax items). Taxpay-
ers generally cannot use the accrual method for deductions and the cash receipts method for
income within a single taxable year.
183 Id. § 442 (2006) (limiting taxpayers' ability to change their annual accounting periods).
184 Id. § 444(a), (e) (2006).
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the installment method'85 can be subject to an interest charge on the deferred
tax liability.'86 Thus, explicit elections can be useful in adding simplicity and
administrability to the tax system, but where the added simplicity materially
and artificially reduces the tax burden on the taxpayer, the imposition of an
additional charge in order to compensate the fisc for the lost revenue should
be considered.
D. Condoning Tax Planning
Other explicit elections merely have the impact of condoning tax plan-
ning without serving one of the other enumerated functions in significant
respects. Of course, all explicit elections cede to the taxpayer the ability to
choose which tax rules apply to a particular situation, thereby effectively
enabling tax planning. However, elections discussed in this Part generally
enable tax planning without materially contributing to the accomplishment
of the other functions of elections. Some of these elections that enable tax
planning may be provided deliberately by Congress, but others are likely a
result of compromise or indifference. Regardless of the genesis of a particu-
lar election, its existence inherently condones tax planning.
There may be some inherent value in giving taxpayers the ability to act
on the tax system rather than just having the tax system act on them because
"[c]hoice makes people feel powerful and in control of their lives ...
Choices provide personal autonomy, something we value as a culture and
nation."'87 However, as discussed above, taxpayer choice and taxpayers'
ability to engage in tax planning suffers from many criticisms. 8 Thus,
where elections serve the primary purpose of providing choice and enabling
tax planning, the rationale for empowering taxpayers should be carefully
examined. Accordingly, this Part attempts to identify a variety of possible
justifications for elections that primarily enable tax planning, including elec-
tions that are intentionally designed to do so, elections that empower taxpay-
ers to choose their own tax treatment where planning opportunities are
sufficiently constrained, elections that allow taxpayers the opportunity to se-
lect a method for implementing a policy goal articulated by Congress, and
elections that enable taxpayers to reveal information about their personal
circumstances. Some of these explanations are more compelling than others,
and some justifications are compelling only in limited circumstances. More-
over, there are some elections that effectively enable tax planning, but fail to
meet any of these limited justifications for tax-planning elections. These
85 Technically, installment method treatment is the default rule, and the election that is
available to taxpayers is out of the installment method treatment. Id. § 453(a), (d) (2006).
However, the choice to accept the default treatment and not to opt out reflects a choice itself.
186 Id. § 453A (2006).
"8' Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,
50-52 (1996).
88 See supra Part II.
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elections are the most troubling, and Congress should be wary of these uses
of explicit elections.
1. Intentionally Encouraging Tax Planning
Occasionally, Congress enacts tax laws expressly designed to en-
courage taxpayers to plan their economic affairs in a way that confers the
optimal tax result to the taxpayer. For example, eligible taxpayers can elect
whether or not to take the Hope Scholarship Credit (now called the Ameri-
can Opportunity Tax Credit) or the Lifetime Learning Credit.189 Taxpayers
generally will choose the option that provides them with the largest subsidy
for their educational expenditures, 90 and perhaps taxpayers will take the
availability of the credits into account when deciding whether or not to make
post-secondary educational expenditures. Thus, with respect to tax expendi-
tures that are generally intended to promote a social goal, 9' such as educa-
tion, explicit elections provided in tax expenditures enable a taxpayer to
accept the subsidy only when it is actually beneficial-i.e., when it best
reduces the taxpayer's tax burden.
Another example involves a combination of implicit and explicit
choices that enables taxpayers to save for retirement in a tax-efficient man-
ner. Taxpayers can make an implicit choice to contribute to tax-favored re-
tirement savings accounts like employer-sponsored qualified plans or
individual retirement accounts. 192 When doing so, taxpayers can make the
explicit choice between two different tax-favored approaches. By checking a
box on a form filed with the trustee of the account, 93 taxpayers can elect to
have the retirement contributions treated as "traditional"-style-i.e., subject
to tax upon distribution, but not subject to current tax' 94-or "Roth"-style--
i.e., subject to current tax, but not subject to tax on distribution. 95 The tax-
favored status of qualified plans is intended to "encourage employers to es-
tablish non-discriminatory retirement plans for their employees," and the
availability of multiple different tax treatment options for those retirement
189 I.R.C. § 25A(b)(1), (c), (e), (i) (2006), amended by American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1004, 123 Stat. 115, 313-16 (to be codified in 26
U.S.C.).
19 Often times, taxpayers will only be eligible for one credit or the other. Even in that
situation, the taxpayer has to affirmatively elect to receive the Hope Scholarship Credit, and
the taxpayer can elect out of receiving any educational credit at all. Id.
' STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, I I0 TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 12-13 (Comm. Print 2008) (discussing "social spending" tax
expenditures).
192 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401(k)(2) (2006) (allowing elective deferrals of compensation under
a qualified plan).
'93 Although the taxpayer's choice as to his preferred approach for taxing the retirement
account is not communicated directly to the Service, it is communicated to the Service indi-
rectly, via the account trustee.
194 I.R.C. § 402 (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
195 Id. § 402A (2006). Note that the taxpayer must specifically designate that his contribu-
tion is intended to be a Roth contribution to a qualified Roth contribution program. Id.
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savings, among which the taxpayer can elect, enables taxpayers to arrange
their affairs so as to save for retirement in the manner they find most tax-
favorable. 196
When the tax law is designed to subsidize certain actions and incen-
tivize taxpayers to undertake those actions, explicit elections advance that
social policy goal by giving taxpayers power to plan their affairs so as to
achieve the best combination of economic and tax consequences. However,
the use of explicit elections to encourage tax planning assumes that the tax
system is an appropriate tool for encouraging people to alter their behav-
ior. 97 Moreover, the provision of choice, and particularly the increasing
number of choices for retirement planning, can make the tax system even
more complex for taxpayers. 19 Ultimately, a high degree of complexity in
making the choice can undermine the explicit election's goal of encouraging
people to engage in tax planning. Faced with too many choices, a taxpayer
may be more likely to make a choice that does not provide him the greatest
benefit, or the taxpayer may decline to make a choice at all.199 Thus, if an
explicit election is included in the Code in an effort to encourage people to
use the tax system to plan their economic affairs, Congress should be wary
of providing too many choices and of making those choices too complex.
2. Empowering Taxpayers Where the Planning Opportunities Are
Constrained
Where planning opportunities are relatively constrained,2°° explicit elec-
tions can also provide taxpayers with some degree of personal autonomy.
20'
196 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT-LAW
TAX RULES RELATING TO QUALIFIED PENSION PLANS (Comm. Print 1990); see also H.R. REP.
No. 105-148, at 336-38 (1997) (explaining that the tax law changes that enable different types
of IRAs are intended to encourage savings by providing a different tax-favored savings vehicle
that may be "more suitable for their savings needs"). See generally David A. Pratt, Nor Rhyme
Nor Reason: Simplifying Defined Contribution Plans, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 741, 746-47 (2001).
' See generally Thomas L. Hungerford, Tax Expenditures: Good, Bad or Ugly?, 113 TAX
NOTES 325 (2006).
1' See Daniel Halperin, Fun and Games with the Roth IRA, 112 TAX NOTES 167 (2006)
(criticizing the increasing complexity of options for retirement savings, focusing on changes to
the Roth IRA); see also BARRY SCHWARZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY LESS IS MORE
(2004) (arguing that too much choice can be paralyzing). See generally supra notes 26-39
(discussing the complexity created by elections in general).
' See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 91 (2005) (explaining that taxpayers are
"paralyzed by the range of tax-preferred savings choices").
200 See Schizer, Sticks, supra note 8, at 1349 n.32 (discussing the possibility of "severely
constraining the planning option").
201 See Abreu, supra note 187. However, as discussed herein, there are many downsides to
the provision of choice. One important consideration is that, to the extent that taxpayers are
given the ability to make some choices about their tax treatments, they may want an increasing
amount of choice, and they may feel emboldened to seek out additional implicit and, perhaps,
illegal opportunities to choose to reduce their tax burdens. Cf. Joshua D. Rosenberg, A Helpful
and Efficient IRS: Some Simple and Powerful Suggestions, 88 KY. L.J. 33, 36 n.7 (1999-2000)
(noting that small areas of noncompliance may lead to noncompliance in other areas).
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The key issue is identifying situations in which the practical ability to exer-
cise the election is limited in a meaningful way so as to prevent taxpayers
from significantly reducing their taxes and from using the tax rules in an
unintended way. Two considerations that may help identify such situations
are: (1) the imposition of third-party tradeoffs, where making or failing to
make the election affects not only the electing taxpayer, but also other tax-
payers; and (2) the existence of factual uncertainty, where the tax conse-
quences of making or failing to make the election depend on events that will
occur in the future, that are uncertain, and that are largely outside the tax-
payer's control. The § 83(b) election, while far from perfect, helps to illus-
trate these factors. Very generally, § 83(b) allows taxpayers who receive
property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture to elect to pay current tax
on the property rather than deferring the payment of tax until the restrictions
lapse.
202
While most tax elections affect only the electing taxpayer and, of
course, the fisc, 203 the § 83(b) election also affects third parties because a
taxpayer's decision whether or not to make the § 83(b) election determines
the timing and amount of the compensation deduction available to the trans-
feror of the property. 04 Notably, the incentives of the transferee and trans-
feror may be adverse; the transferee may want to defer taxation and the
transferor may want to accelerate the compensation deduction, or vice
versa.205 Accordingly, the transferor will have a vested interest in having
information about, and potentially being involved in, the transferee's deci-
sion. Further, the transferee and transferor may negotiate over whether the
transferee will make a § 83(b) election. 2 6 Thus, the presence of a non-elect-
ing third party who has an arm's length relationship with the taxpayer and
whose tax burden is directly affected2 7 by the election can limit °8 the elect-
202 I.R.C. § 83(a), (b) (2006).
203 For example, a taxpayer's decision to take the standard deduction or to itemize deduc-
tions affects him alone and does not directly affect any other taxpayers. Id. § 63(b), (e) (2006).
2o4 Id. § 83(h) (2006).
205 The preferences of the employer and employee depend on their individual situations.
See Knoll, supra note 33 (discussing when and whether a § 83(b) election is in the interests of
the employee and/or employer).
206 See id. (suggesting that the employee and employer jointly decide whether an election
should be made).
207 Of course, other non-electing taxpayers are indirectly affected by the election as well,
in that the election may reduce the total amount of money collected by the government.
20 Typically, this limit would be imposed via contract. For example, even though the
§ 83(b) election is made by the employee alone, the employer could, as a condition of the
grant of the restricted property, require, or prohibit, the making of the § 83(b) election. See
generally id. Similarly, the regular § 338 election can be made by the purchaser alone, but the
seller may request a provision in the purchase agreement requiring the purchaser to, or prohib-
iting the purchaser from, making the election, and this may be subject to negotiation between
the seller and the purchaser. Cf GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 79, ch. 22 (suggesting differ-




ing taxpayer's otherwise unfettered ability to choose. 2°9 This limit imposes a
tax friction, or "statutory speed bump," which hinders the taxpayer's ability
to exercise the explicit election in an abusive manner.21 0
In addition, for many elections, the taxpayer can know exactly how
much tax he will owe if he makes one decision rather than another,21" ' but the
§ 83(b) election is a gamble. A § 83(b) election often involves significant
uncertainty 2 2 because the determination of whether a § 83(b) election is ad-
vantageous for the taxpayer depends on a variety of factors, including
whether the taxpayer will forfeit the property before the restrictions lapse
and whether the value of the property will increase or decrease between the
time of the grant and the time when the restrictions on the property lapse.
213
The uncertainty as to the tax consequences of making or not making the
§ 83(b) election significantly limits a taxpayer's ability to engage in tax min-
imization.214 For situations in which the use of elections to engage in tax
planning is undesirable or can lead to abuse,215 the uncertainty that arises
from the inability of taxpayers to predict future facts may help to stem possi-
bly abusive outcomes.
216
This discussion does not provide an affirmative case for including ex-
plicit elections in the Code to enable taxpayers to engage in tax planning.
209 In contrast, where the tax election affects only the taxpayer, the taxpayer will generally
make a pure tax choice, electing the alternative that enables him to pay the least amount of tax,
without being affected by non-tax business consequences of the choice (business frictions) and
without being constrained by the way in which third parties' tax consequences are affected (tax
frictions). In many circumstances, this may not be troublesome, but in the absence of any
frictions limiting the tax choice, there may be an increased risk of abusive tax behavior.
210 See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007) (explaining how third parties acting at arm's length
can provide a structural mechanism for increasing taxpayer compliance and assisting in en-
forcement of the tax laws); see also Schizer, Sticks, supra note 8, at 1349 n.32 (explaining that
symmetry "can severely constrain the planning option"). Taxpayers' unfettered ability to make
tax choices is similarly constrained when elections must be made jointly by multiple taxpayers
who may have adverse interests, as the electing taxpayers are likely to negotiate about whether
the election will be made. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2007)
(requiring that the § 338(h)(10) election be made jointly by the seller and the buyer).
211 For example, a taxpayer's decision to take the standard deduction rather than itemized
deductions lacks uncertainty; the taxpayer can know exactly how much tax he will owe under
the alternative choices and can make the election in a way that will reduce his taxes with great
certainty.
22 Note that this is uncertainty regarding what the facts will be and not uncertainty regard-
ing the rules of law that will be applicable to whatever facts arise.
213 See generally Knoll, supra note 33.
214 See Schizer, Sticks, supra note 8, at 1360-61 (arguing that uncertainty discourages
planning).
215 For example, foreign business entities have made entity classification elections in situa-
tions where there is great certainty about the tax consequences, and these elections have re-
sulted in significant tax benefits to the foreign entities and have been described by many
commentators as abusive. See Field, supra note 10, at 487-91 (summarizing abuses encoun-
tered when foreign entities make entity classification elections).
216 On the other hand, certainty as to the tax result of an election can be good if the goal is
to enable taxpayers to plan their affairs in a way that best reduces tax, as discussed in Part
III.D.1, supra.
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However, it suggests that, to the extent that there is a desire to use explicit
elections to allow taxpayers to make choices about their tax treatment,
2 7
elections that involve third-party tradeoffs and factual uncertainty may not
be as likely to pose the same threat of abuse as some other elections. Even
though taxpayers may still try to use the election to engage in tax planning,
the third-party tradeoffs and factual uncertainty reduce taxpayers' ability to
use elections to significantly reduce their taxes.
3. Allowing Taxpayers to Select a Method for Implementing a
Policy Goal Articulated by Congress
Explicit elections also exist in situations where Congress articulates a
specific policy goal but does not specify how that policy goal is to be
achieved. Instead, taxpayers are provided with a choice of methods among
two or more options to implement the articulated policy goal, and thus tax-
payers are given an opportunity to engage in tax planning. Where there is no
single method that most effectively implements an articulated policy objec-
tive, allowing taxpayers to elect among different methods that are approxi-
mately equally effective may be reasonable. This is particularly true where
there is an affirmative desire to allow taxpayers to make their tax treatment
reflective of their economic arrangements218 and where there are factual un-
certainties and/or third-party tradeoffs involved in calculating the ultimate
tax benefit of the different methods.
219
For example, § 704(c)(1)(A) generally requires that taxpayers properly
take account of precontribution gain or loss inherent in property contributed
to partnerships. 20 The regulations provide the taxpayer with three methods
for doing so,22 ' and each method strikes a slightly different balance between
the desire to accommodate the principle of nonrecognition of gains and
losses upon contributions to partnerships 222 and the desire to tax precontribu-
27 This desire may arise in a specific circumstance or, more generally, in an effort to
empower taxpayers to have a voice in the way the tax system applies to them.
218 See infra Part III.D.4.
219 See supra Part III.D.2.
220 It is difficult to categorize the choice provided by § 704(c) as either explicit or implicit.
On one hand, the choice of a § 704(c) method is explicit because the parties merely choose a
tax method and communicate it to the Service. On the other hand, the choice of a § 704(c)
method is implicit because the way in which the choice is communicated is via the actual
allocation of income and loss among the partners. Nevertheless, § 704(c) provides a useful
illustration of a situation in which Congress has articulated a particular policy goal and pro-
vided a choice to the taxpayer of the method for accomplishing that goal. Further, as compared
to the election in § 362(e)(2), the options for § 704(c) methods provided to the taxpayer all
reasonably accomplish the articulated objective, and, as discussed in the text, it is in these
types of cases where there may be an argument to allow the taxpayers to choose their treat-
ment. I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3 (as amended in 2005).
221 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b) (traditional method); id. § 1.704-3(c) (traditional method with
curative allocations); id. § 1.704-3(d) (remedial method).
222 I.R.C. § 721 (2006).
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tion gains and losses back to the partner who contributed the property. 223
One of these § 704(c) methods may be slightly more effective in implement-
ing the policy objectives than the other methods,2 4 but each is a reasonable
approach to implementing the goal of § 704(c)(1)(A). 25 Moreover, Congress
explicitly stated its desire that taxpayers be provided with the flexibility to
accomplish the stated policy objective,226 and, given that the partners have
different, and often adverse, incentives as to how to take account of precon-
tribution gains and losses,2 27 Congress anticipated little risk of abuse. 228 Nev-
ertheless, Congress could have, and possibly should have, simply selected a
single method for handling precontribution gains and losses.
Similarly, in an effort to prevent taxpayers from duplicating losses upon
the contribution of loss property to a corporation, Congress enacted
§ 362(e)(2). Section 362(e)(2) generally provides that the loss inherent in
property contributed to a corporation can be preserved through either the
corporation's basis in the contributed property or in the contributor's basis in
the corporate stock the contributor receives in the exchange, but not both;
2 29
the taxpayer has the ability to elect between the two alternatives.
2 30
With § 362(e)(2), as with § 704(c)(1)(A), Congress articulated a policy
goal and allowed taxpayers to choose how to accomplish the goal. However,
with § 362(e)(2), the two options provided to the taxpayer are not equally
plausible methods for accomplishing the articulated policy goal. Preserving
the loss in the corporate stock accomplishes the policy goal of preventing
"the importation of built-in losses"2 3' significantly better than preserving the
223 See T.D, 8500, 1994-1 C.B. 183 (explaining that the § 704(c) regulations provide
methods for "making allocations so that the contributing partner receives the tax burdens and
benefits of any built-in gain or loss."); see also MCKEE ET AL., supra note 98 11.04 (explain-
ing how the different § 704(c) methods work).
224 One could argue that the remedial method best reflects economic income and thus most
effectively accomplishes the policy objective of § 704(c) because it most closely ensures that
taxpayers will be allocated their rightful shares of gain and loss attributable to the contributed
property regardless of whether the partnership has items of such gain and loss. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-3(d). However, the remedial method invokes fictions that depart from the reality of tax
items actually recognized. id.
225 For example, the traditional method focuses on the actual items of tax gain and loss
that are recognized. Id. § 1.704-3(a).
226 H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 857 (1984); 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992) (explaining
the rationale behind the proposed regulations).
227 This is a variation on the concept of third-party tradeoffs discussed in Part III.D.2,
supra.
228 H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 857; 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (explaining the rationale behind the
proposed regulations).
229 Absent § 362(e)(2), if a taxpayer contributes loss property to a corporation in a nonrec-
ognition transaction, that loss would be duplicated-the taxpayer would have loss built into
the stock he holds in the corporation, and the corporation would have loss built into the asset
contributed from the taxpayer (i.e., loss "imported" into the corporation). I.R.C. § 362(a)
(2006) (corporation's basis in contributed property); id. § 358(a)(1) (2006) (contributing tax-
payer's basis in stock received in the exchange). Section 362(e)(2) prevents the loss inherent in
the contributed asset from being preserved in both places.
230 Id. § 362(e)(2)(C) (2006).
231 H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 1686 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).
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loss in the corporation's basis in the property received.232 Moreover, the leg-
islative history fails to explain why taxpayers are being provided with this
choice. Both the original House bill and the Senate amendment chose a sin-
gle method for accomplishing the policy goal; both provided that the loss
inherent in the contributed property would be preserved only in the contribu-
tor's stock.233 The election was added in the conference agreement, and the
legislative history merely states that the conference agreement allows the
transferee and transferor to choose whether to preserve the loss in the con-
tributing shareholder's stock or in the corporation's property.234
This type of election, where Congress articulates a policy goal but al-
lows the taxpayers to choose how to effectuate that goal, may reflect politi-
cal compromise or indifference. 235 In these types of situations, an election
that allows a taxpayer to decide how to effectuate an articulated policy goal
is much more defensible when the alternatives available pursuant to the elec-
tion reflect methods that are more or less equally plausible approaches to the
tax policy objective. If one alternative approach more effectively accom-
plishes the policy objective, Congress may well have a significant interest in
which alternatives are elected by taxpayers. In such situations, Congress
should not be indifferent to the result and should be wary of ceding to tax-
payers the power to determine how to implement the policy objective. More-
over, even where an election would allow taxpayers to choose among
equally plausible methods of accomplishing a policy goal, Congress should
be careful of the possibility that deference to taxpayers regarding how to
achieve a policy objective might suggest deregulation of the tax law236 or
reflect abdication of Congress's responsibility to establish the tax law.
232 As explained in note 229, supra, the loss inherent in contributed property can be pre-
served either in the shareholder's basis in the corporate stock or in the corporation's basis in the
property received in the contribution. If the corporation takes the contributed property with the
lower fair market value basis, and the loss is preserved in the basis of the shareholder's stock,
then no loss has been imported into the corporation. However, if the shareholder reduces its
outside basis in its corporate stock down to the fair market value of the contributed asset, and
the loss is preserved in the property itself (owned by the corporation after the contribution),
then a loss has been imported into the corporation even though there has been no duplication
of that loss.
233 See H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 1686.
234 See id.
"I The election provided by § 362(e)(2)(C) could also be a concession to taxpayers in
light of the asymmetric treatment for contributions to corporations of property with built-in
gains (which does get duplicated) and contributions to corporations of property with built-in
losses (which does not get duplicated).
236 See Dean, supra note 65, at 420 (explaining that tax reforms that defer to taxpayer
preferences, i.e., deregulatory reforms, "will sometimes give rise to changes that have undesir-
able systemic consequences such as increasing waste" "[b]ecause the[ ] focus [of such re-




4. Revealing Valuable Information About Taxpayers' Individual
Situations
Explicit elections also condone tax planning in situations where the tax-
payers possess information that, when revealed, can enable their tax treat-
ment to be tailored to their personal circumstances. In exercising his ability
to make an explicit election, the taxpayer has the opportunity to make a
statement about himself and his specific personal situation.237 This communi-
cation can serve several functions.
Fundamentally, an election that discloses personal information can enti-
tle the taxpayer to some beneficial tax treatment that is available only when
particular circumstances exist. Of course, it is common for taxpayers to re-
veal personal information when filing their tax returns, whether or not they
make many explicit elections. For example, a taxpayer who claims a depen-
dency exemption indicates that the taxpayer has a dependent, which in turn
enables the taxpayer to reduce his tax liability.23 Explicit elections can,
through their eligibility requirements, force the disclosure of additional de-
tailed information about the electing taxpayer, and Congress can use these
disclosure obligations to ensure that the beneficial tax treatment is only
available for certain taxpayers.
For example, in the context of stock redemptions that completely termi-
nate a shareholder's actual interest in a corporation, § 302(c)(2) allows tax-
payers to explicitly elect to waive the family attribution rules. As a result,
the redemption of the taxpayer's stock is more likely to be taxed as a sale
than as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits.239 However, this
election is only available where the taxpayer lacks, and will continue to lack,
any significant involvement in, and control over, the corporation. 24° The tax-
payer himself is in a better position than the IRS to determine the extent to
which he is, and will continue to be, involved in the corporation. The re-
quirements of the election also contain a monitoring obligation, in that the
taxpayer has a continuing burden to inform the Service if any of the condi-
237 This Part discusses situations where the taxpayer's statement communicates more than
just the taxpayer's desire to pay as little tax as possible.
238 See I.R.C. § 151 (2006).
239 Section 302 sets out five tests for determining whether a redemption will be treated as
a sale or as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits. Id. § 302(b) (2006). One such test
requires that the shareholder's interest in the corporation is completely terminated. Id.
§ 302(b)(3). A shareholder's interest in a corporation is generally determined after taking into
account the constructive ownership rules of § 318. Id. § 301(c)(1) (2006). As a result, a share-
holder may be treated as constructively owning stock in a corporation even if he owns no
actual stock after the redemption. However, if the attribution rules are waived under
§ 302(c)(2), the taxpayer will not be treated as constructively owning stock that is owned by
his family members. Id. § 302(c)(2) (2006). This increases the possibility that the taxpayer
could be treated as owning none of the corporation's stock after the redemption and thus in-
creases the chances that the taxpayer will meet the complete termination test of § 302(b)(3).
Thus, when the attribution rules are waived, the redemption is more likely to be taxed as a sale
rather than as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits.
I Id. § 302(c)(2).
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tions allowing the election cease to be true.24' Thus, by making the election,
the taxpayer communicates to the Service information about his specific cir-
cumstances, which entitles him to receive the more favorable tax treatment.
Information-revealing elections can be valuable to the Service for more
than just ensuring that particular tax benefits are only available to taxpayers
in particular circumstances. The information revealed can also be used by
the Service for determining how best to use its resources to enforce the tax
laws. For example, Professor Alex Raskolnikov has proposed that taxpayers
should be able to make an election between two different enforcement re-
gimes that could apply to them.142 Taxpayers who generally do not aggres-
sively game the tax system will likely identify themselves by choosing the
enforcement regime with lower penalties but with many pro-government
presumptions. 2 43 On the other hand, gainers will likely elect the enforcement
regime without the pro-government presumptions, even though it may im-
pose higher penalties.244 Professor Raskolnikov argues that the election pro-
vides information to the Service about the compliance attitudes of the
taxpayers, thereby enabling the Service to target enforcement efforts to dif-
ferent types of taxpayers.
2 45
However, the Service need not act on information provided by an elec-
tion in order for there to be merit in an information-revealing election. Elec-
tions can also be valuable even if they only serve as an outlet for
expression. 246 That is, there can be value in an election that enables a tax-
payer to reveal information about himself, even if the Service does not care
about or even understand the substance of the information reflected in the
choice.
For example, a married couple's election to file returns either jointly or
separately 247 often provides a pure tax-planning opportunity, pursuant to
which the couple chooses the filing status that best reduces their aggregate
tax burden.2 4s However, a couple's choice to file jointly or separately can
24 Id. § 302(c)(2)(A).
242 See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax En-
forcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009).
243 Id. at 708-10.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 708-10, 740-54.
246 Some elections reveal information not only to the Service, but also to third parties. For
example, if an employer grants restricted property to an employee, but that property is subject
to forfeiture if the employee quits within five years, an employee who refuses to make a
§ 83(b) election may be revealing that he expects to leave the company within the five-year
forfeiture period.
24 I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006).
248 Congress gave married couples the ability to file jointly in the 1940s, in response to the
difference between the treatment of married couples living in community property states and
married couples living in common law states. See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 22-25 (1948). See
generally Boris Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1412-14 (1975). Rather than legislating a uniform tax treatment for married couples or contin-
uing to allow state law rights of some married couples to effectuate income-splitting for fed-
eral income tax purposes, Congress adopted a compromise position and gave all married
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also reflect the state of the couple's particular situation and convey informa-
tion to the government about the way in which the two individuals view
themselves and their relationship. For example, spouses that are separating
may wish to file separately and keep certain financial information private
from the other spouse.2 49 Similarly, people who marry later in life may wish
to continue to maintain separate financial records and filings. Further, as
same-sex couples gain the right to marry in some states, the ability to file
jointly in those states 250 may be symbolically important to such a couple.
Thus, even though the ability of married couples to elect to file jointly or
separately historically provided a pure tax-planning opportunity, this elec-
tion also allows some modem families the opportunity to have the determi-
nation of their tax treatment reflect their personal circumstances.
Nevertheless, particularly for the many couples who still treat the election as
a pure tax-planning opportunity, the availability of the election is difficult to
defend.
E. Conclusions About Functions of Explicit Elections
All explicit elections enable taxpayers to choose the tax rules that apply
to them, and thus explicit elections empower taxpayers to minimize their tax
burdens. However, this Part demonstrates that explicit elections may have
some redeeming value. Particularly where the tax system already provides
taxpayers some implicit choice between multiple tax regimes or where a
simplicity or administrability goal can be served, explicit elections may help
minimize the adverse consequences of our less-than-perfect tax system. Ad-
ditionally, in the limited circumstances where Congress wants to afford tax-
planning opportunities to taxpayers or where there may be inherent value in
affording taxpayers some degree of personal autonomy within the tax sys-
tem, explicit elections can be used to provide those opportunities. Neverthe-
less, the various functions of elections described herein are not equally
useful, and even within functional categories, some elections may be more
effective than others. Further, as discussed above, each use of explicit elec-
tions has significant limitations, so tax elections should be used with cau-
couples the choice of whether to split their income. See id. at 1412-14. As enacted, the ability
of married taxpayers to file jointly or separately provided a pure tax-planning opportunity and
allowed a tax reduction to the vast majority of married couples living in common law states.
See id. at 1413. Today, this election is commonly used by taxpayers as an opportunity to
reduce taxes without any other consequence. A married couple's accountant can tell the couple
what its tax burden will be if the spouses file jointly and if the spouses file separately, and the
married couple can just select the filing status that will provide the lower tax burden. It is often
advantageous for married taxpayers to file jointly, but in limited circumstances, such as where
one spouse has significant unreimbursed medical expenses and relatively low income, separate
filing can provide a lower aggregate tax burden. See generally MArIN J. MCMAHON, JR. &
LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 44.02 (2007).
249 See id.
250 Even if a same-sex couple is legally married in their state of residence, they may not
file as married for federal income tax purposes.
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tion. However, by articulating and assessing the functions that explicit
elections can serve, their benefits can be balanced against the criticisms of
elections that were described in Part II, thereby enabling a more comprehen-
sive analysis of the role of explicit choice in the tax law.
IV. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR DESIGNING EXPLICIT ELECTIONS
Several key issues affect the balance between the possible benefits of
an election and the potential problems it creates. Accordingly, this Part
draws on experience with several elections in order to distill some generally
applicable recommendations about how to design explicit elections so as to
maximize their efficacy and minimize problems associated with their use.
A. Default Rules
Explicit elections generally provide taxpayers with an opportunity to
opt out of a default treatment. Typically, this default treatment is specifically
provided in the statute or regulations. For example, § 743(a) provides that
there is no adjustment to the basis of partnership property upon the transfer
of a partnership interest unless there is a § 754 election in effect. Further, the
entity classification regulations provide that unincorporated domestic entities
are generally treated as partnerships or disregarded entities (depending on
the number of owners) unless the entity elects to be taxed as a corporation.251
The default rules for several elections have changed over time.25 2
The choice of a default rule can have a significant impact on the conse-
quences of the tax election, and commentators advocate different approaches
to the design of default rules.253 Default rules can be designed to meet tax-
25 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (as amended in 2006); see also id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)
(providing slightly different default rules for the classification of foreign eligible entities not
making elections).
252 For example, taxpayers originally had to elect to take the standard deduction, but now
the standard deduction is the default treatment, and taxpayers who want to itemize must elect
out. Compare I.R.C. §§ 63, 144 (1976) (providing that the "standard deduction shall be al-
lowed if taxpayer so elects" and that, otherwise, deductions must be itemized), with id. § 63
(2006) (providing that taxpayers are entitled to the standard deduction unless they elect to
itemize their deduction). Similarly, the installment sale treatment used to be elective, but now
it is the default. Compare id. § 453(a), (c) (1964) (providing that a taxpayer may use the
installment method if he so elects), with id. § 453(a), (d) (2006) (the installment method shall
apply unless the taxpayer elects out of its application); H. REP. No. 96-1042, at 2 (1980) ("The
bill eliminates the present law requirement that the installment method must be elected for
reporting gains from sales of realty and nondealer personal property. Instead, the provision
will automatically apply to a qualified sale unless the taxpayer elects not to have the provision
apply with respect to a deferred payment sale.").25 3 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTER3ROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (default rules in corporate law); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989) (default rules in contracts); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bar-
gaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Erik
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payer expectations and to provide to taxpayers what they would have wanted
had they had complete information.25 4 Alternatively, default rules can be
"penalty defaults," which "purposefully set [the default rule] at what the
parties would not want" in order to "give at least one party... an incentive
to contract around the default rules and therefore to choose affirmatively the
contract provision they prefer,"255 thereby inducing "valuable information
revelation with low transaction costs. ' 256 Although most of the academic
literature discussing default rules comes from contract theory and corporate
law theory, 257 much of the analysis is transferable into the setting of tax
elections by treating the election as the taxpayer's opportunity to contract out
of a default term in an implied agreement between the taxpayer and the
government.25 s
When considering these alternative approaches in the context of tax
elections, default rules that meet taxpayer expectations are generally prefera-
ble to penalty default rules. By meeting expectations, the default rules en-
hance equity because taxpayers who might fail to make an election because
of their lack of knowledge, sophistication, or ability to afford advice are
likely to get their desired treatment anyway and thus are less likely to be
harmed as a result of their lack of knowledge. The ALI advocated for this
approach in its proposed reorganization election, explaining that "in the ab-
sence of an effective election, acquisitions should be classified as simply and
as consistently as possible with the likely expectations of those who are most
apt to neglect to make a specific election.
2 59
In contrast, a penalty default rule generally provides undesirable tax
treatment to those taxpayers who, for whatever reason, fail to act. This could
disadvantage less knowledgeable and less sophisticated taxpayers who might
not know which choice to make (or even know that there is a choice to
make). Moreover, using penalty default rules in tax elections would likely
raise transaction costs,2 60 given that significant numbers of taxpayers would
not want the default treatment and would thus have to elect out. Thus, trans-
action costs are generally reduced by choosing default rules that meet tax-
payer expectations because fewer elections need to be filed, which makes
Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 557 (2006); cf
Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145 (1998)
(considering a penalty default in taxing household income).
254 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 253.
255 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 253, at 91.
256 See id. at 128.
257 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 253; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 253;
Craswell, supra note 253; Johnston, supra note 253.
218 For tax elections that impose third party tradeoffs or that are made jointly by multiple
taxpayers, the election can be understood as a way to contract out of default treatment via an
agreement among the government and all taxpayers who are directly affected by the election.
259A.L.I. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION ELECTION, supra note 144, at 41-42.
260 For example, reversing the current default rules for the check-the-box regulations
would mean that a huge number of additional elections would have to be filed, creating signifi-
cant additional paperwork for taxpayers to prepare and for the IRS to process.
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the exercise of the tax choice simpler for taxpayers and easier to administer
for the Service. For example, the default rules for the entity classification
election seem, very generally, to meet taxpayers' expectations; of the mil-
lions of domestic businesses formed since the enactment of the entity classi-
fication election, only approximately 174,000 newly-formed domestic
entities filed entity classification elections.26' Similarly, the vast majority of
tax expenditures, such as § 121's exclusion from income for a portion of
gain on the sale of a principal residence, reduce the current tax burden of
(and thus, are generally desired by) taxpayers who are eligible for the tax
expenditures. Thus, the default rules for elective tax expenditures typically
provide that the taxpayer is entitled to the tax benefit unless the taxpayer
elects otherwise.
262
One common problem with the adoption of default rules that are in-
tended to meet the expectations of the parties is defining that expectation.2 63
However, this should not be particularly difficult in many tax contexts-it is
well accepted that taxpayers generally want to reduce their tax liabilities.
Further, taxpayers' behavior can help to demonstrate their preferences and
expectations, thereby enabling Congress or the Service to change a default
rule if it fails to meet taxpayer expectations. For example, the default rules in
§§ 195, 248, and 709 provide that start-up and organizational expenditures
are not amortizable. 264 However, the vast majority of eligible taxpayers
elected to opt out of these default rules and into tax treatment that allowed
amortization, indicating that the default rules provided in the Code failed to
align with taxpayer preferences. 65 In order to better meet taxpayer expecta-
tions, the Treasury promulgated regulations under each of these provisions
"deeming" taxpayers to make the election to amortize start-up and organiza-
tional expenditures unless the taxpayer affirmatively chooses otherwise.2 66 In
effect, these regulations acknowledge that the vast majority of eligible tax-
payers want to elect to amortize these costs, and thus the regulations reverse
the default rules in an effort to meet taxpayer expectations and thereby re-
duce the burden on the taxpayers and the Service.2 67
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there may be a limited role for penalty
default rules in tax elections. For example, since penalty default rules can be
16' Field, supra note 10, at 472 (citing data obtained from the Statistics of Income Division
of the IRS).
262 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121(0 (2006); see also, e.g., id. § 168(b)(1), (b)(5) (2006) (providing
that the default depreciation method for most personal property is the accelerated double de-
clining balance method and that the slower straight line method is only available if the tax-
payer affirmatively elects).
263 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 253, at 93.
264 I.R.C. §§ 195, 248, 709 (2006).
265 T.D. 9411, 2008-34 I.R.B. 398.
6 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.195-IT, 1.248-IT, 1.709-IT (2008) (issued in T.D. 9411).
267 T.D. 9411 ("The manner of filing these elections is . . . in acknowledgment that the
vast majority of taxpayers that incur costs that may be deducted under sections 195, 248, and




used to encourage the revelation of valuable information,268 a penalty default
rule may be appropriate where the government needs particular information
from a taxpayer before affording the taxpayer certain favorable treatment.
One example is a taxpayer's ability to elect to waive the family attribution
rules for purposes of determining whether a stock redemption will be treated
as a sale.26 9 As discussed in Part III.D.4, under § 302, when a taxpayer and
one or more of his family members own stock in a corporation, favorable tax
treatment of the redemption of the taxpayer's stock may only be available if
the taxpayer elects to waive family attribution. The taxpayer can only make
the election by providing information to the Service explaining that the tax-
payer lacks and will continue to lack any significant involvement in, and
control over, the corporation. 270 That is, § 302(c)(2) effectively provides that
Congress is only willing to afford the more favorable treatment to a taxpayer
if certain facts are present, and thus the availability of the more favorable tax
treatment is conditioned on the provision of specific information to the Ser-
vice. Thus the penalty default works to limit the favorable tax treatment to
those situations where the taxpayer communicates to the government that
certain facts exist.
Nevertheless, absent a strong justification for the use of a penalty de-
fault, the tax law should generally employ default rules that meet taxpayer
expectations because expectation-meeting default rules generally enhance
the efficacy of an election while minimizing the burden imposed by the elec-
tion on taxpayers and the Service. Ultimately, regardless of which type of
default rule is adopted for a particular election, the default rule should be
selected with care.
B. Eligibility Limitations
Every explicit election is subject to eligibility requirements that define
the set of situations where the election is available. For example, a § 338
election is only available if, among other requirements, there is a purchase of
eighty percent or more of a target corporation's stock,27" ' and in order to make
an entity classification election, a business cannot be incorporated under a
state or federal incorporation statute.272
Any limitation on the availability of an election necessarily draws a line
and treats some taxpayers differently than others. For example, a two-mem-
ber domestic limited liability company ("LLC") is generally eligible to
make an entity classification election, while a two-shareholder domestic cor-
poration is not, even though both businesses may have substantially similar
268 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 253, at 128.
269 I.R.C. § 302(c)(2) (2006); see supra Part II.D.4 (discussing the election available pur-
suant to § 302(c)(2)).
270 I.R.C. § 302(c)(2).
271 Id. § 338(a), (d)(3) (2006).
272 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2009).
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legal and economic arrangements."' This type of limitation on the availabil-
ity of the election should be defensible both in the affirmative and in the
negative; the election should be allowed in all situations where the function
of the election is served, and the election should be prohibited where the
function is not served. Over-inclusive and under-inclusive eligibility require-
ments can limit the efficacy of the election and can introduce inequities and
inefficiencies, possibly creating as many problems as the election itself is
intended to solve. For example, some scholars have argued that the entity
classification rules2 74 draw inappropriate lines,2 75 and some scholars suggest
that private businesses operated in incorporated entities should be treated the
same way as private businesses operated in LLCs.276 Moreover, difficulty in
justifying the limitations on the election can cast suspicion on the use of the
election at all. Thus, when designing or examining an explicit election, atten-
tion should be paid to ensure that the limitations on the election are appropri-
ately drawn.
C. Technical Requirements for Making Elections
Administrative guidance is often needed to explain the technical re-
quirements for making an election-i.e., addressing how the election is
made, when the election is made, and by whom the election is made.277 Con-
gress's delegation of this responsibility to the Treasury is reasonable because
the Treasury is often better-able to determine the precise format and timing
for an election. 278 However, this relationship between statutorily-provided
elections and administratively-provided rules implementing the election
means that there will be a time lag between the enactment of any election
and the promulgation of regulations that explain how to make the election.
That time lag should be minimized to the extent practicable because
shorter time delays enable faster and better implementation of the policy
273 Id. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(1), -3(a).
274 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2006) (defining "corporation"); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3
(the entity classification regulations).
275 See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 499-522 (analyzing the limitations on the entity
classification election and concluding that some of the limitations, including the denial of
entity classification choice for incorporated entities, are difficult to defend).
276 See, e.g., A.L.I. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE STUDY, supra note 158.
277 For example, while § 338 allows taxpayers to elect to treat certain stock sales as asset
sales, the statute specifically defers to regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department
regarding the manner in which the election is made. I.R.C. § 338(g)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.338-2 (2001); see also, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 1231(a), 123 Stat. 115, 338-41 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 108(i)) (adding a
new election enabling taxpayers to defer the inclusion of cancellation of indebtedness); Rev.
Proc. 2009-37, 2009-36 I.R.B. I (describing the time and manner for making an election under
§ 108(i)).
278 This is because the IRS, a bureau of the Treasury Department, is responsible for enforc-
ing the tax laws, and thus the IRS and the Treasury have unique insight into exactly what
information is needed and when that information is needed in order to effectively enforce the
laws.
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behind the election, and longer time delays can pose a significant impedi-
ment to taxpayers' use of the election. An extreme example of this lag in-
volves the § 336(e) election. Very generally, § 336(e) provides that when a
corporation, which owns eighty percent or more of the stock of a subsidiary,
disposes of that stock, an election can be made to treat that stock disposition
as an asset acquisition.279 Section 336(e) was added to the Code in 1986,280
but regulations explaining the consequences of a § 336(e) election and artic-
ulating the technical requirements for making a § 336(e) election were not
proposed until August 2008.281 The absence of these regulations for over
twenty years effectively prevented the § 336(e) election from having any
meaningful impact in the interim. 282 Thus, technical requirements for an ex-
plicit election should be explained as soon as possible after the adoption of
the election because failure to clearly and quickly articulate the technical
requirements for making an election can diminish the potential positive pol-
icy impact of the election.
Further, there are many elections in the Code with a wide variety of
different technical requirements. These different technical requirements are
so burdensome that an entire treatise is dedicated exclusively to listing the
exact method and time frame for making each election.2 83 Thus, any effort to
coordinate the technical requirements of similar or related elections may





Tax elections reflect the ultimate in formalism; they are the essence of
"rules" as opposed to "standards" 285 because they not only present bright
lines that taxpayers can take into account when planning a transaction, but
they also empower taxpayers to choose on which side of the line they wish
to land without changing either the form or the substance of the transaction.
This provides certainty in the tax law, but this certainty enables taxpayers to
use the tax rules in ways that Congress may not have intended, even when
279 In many ways, the § 336(e) election is quite similar to the § 338 election.
28 Tax Law Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); H.R. REP.
No. 99-841 (1986).
281 Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.336-1 to -4, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,965 (Aug. 25, 2008).
282 See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Important Corporate Tax and Related Developments:
2005-2006, in 726 PRACTISING LAW INST., TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFs, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTUR-
INGS 1203-04 (2006) (noting that, in the absence of regulations, it was unclear whether taxpay-
ers could make § 336(e) elections).
283 TAX ELECTIONS DESKBOOK, supra note 14.
284 For example, the Service has provided some coordination between the election to
amortize start-up expenditures under § 195 and the elections to amortize organizational ex-
penses under §§ 248 and 709. See T.D. 9411, 2008-34 I.R.B. 398.
285 See generally Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 51 SMU L.
REV. 131 (2001); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Weis-
bach, supra note 89, at 861-65.
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taxpayers' actions technically comply with the letter of the law. Thus, as with
many rules, the tax planning that is enabled by tax elections can easily be
abusive.
For example, scholars have criticized the use of the entity classification
election for foreign entities because it enables revenue-reducing tax planning
that is inconsistent with the objectives of the Code provisions for taxing
foreign income. 86 Additionally, in response to perceived abuses involving
inappropriate treatment of losses in connection with sales of partnership in-
terests or distributions from partnerships, Congress made certain downward
inside basis adjustments mandatory rather than elective.287
In light of the risk of abuse and misuse of elections, proponents of
explicit elections should be particularly sensitive to the possibility of abuse
and should consider how to counteract the risk. If the abuses of an election
are too severe, then repealing the election may be appropriate. For example,
some commentators proposed eliminating the entity classification election
for foreign entities.288 Short of eliminating an election that presents some
abuses, Congress and the Treasury should be as deliberate and detailed as
possible in designing elections to constrain the availability of the election to
only those situations where the election's use is intended. Unfortunately, this
approach can create significant complexity and can be quite costly to
undertake.289
Alternatively, abuse could be addressed not by changing the election
itself, but by changing the underlying tax provisions that apply depending on
which choice is made in the election. For example, in an effort to curb per-
ceived abuses of the entity classification election for foreign entities, the
Service attempted to modify the Subpart F rules rather than the election it-
self.219 Another approach would be to require that the election operate in
conjunction with anti-abuse rules. For example, taxpayers can make elec-
tions pursuant to § 754, but the resultant tax consequences remain subject to
the general partnership anti-abuse provisions.29' However, introducing an
anti-abuse standard into the analysis may reverse some of the efficiency,
286 See generally Field, supra note 10, at 487-96 (noting that, among other problems,
many commentators are concerned that "the elective nature of the [check-the-box] regulations
as applied to foreign business entities undermines the appropriate application of the Subpart F
and foreign tax credit regimes.").
287 I.R.C. § 743(a) (2006) (mandatory inside basis adjustment upon the sale or exchange
of a partnership interest when there is "substantial built in loss"); id. § 734(a) (2006)
(mandatory inside basis adjustment upon the distribution of property to a partner when there is
a "substantial basis reduction"); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 1673-79 (2004) (Conf.
Rep.) (explaining the risk of abuse requiring these changes).
288 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59
TAX LAW. 649, 669 (2006) (proposing to eliminate the elective nature of entity classification
for foreign entities).
289 This is often the case when rules are used instead of standards. See generally Kaplow,
supra note 285; Sunstein, supra note 285; Weisbach, supra note 89, at 861-65.
29 See generally Field, supra note 10, at 488-89 & nn. 198-202.
291 See I.R.C. § 701 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), exs. 8-9 (1995).
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simplicity, and certainty gains conferred by the election. 9 2 Regardless of the
particular approach taken to stymie abuse of elections, legislators and ad-
ministrators should understand that all explicit elections pose the risk of
abuse because they are inherently tax-planning opportunities. Thus, if possi-
ble, that risk of abuse should be monitored and addressed.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is neither to staunchly defend all of the
existing explicit tax elections nor to advocate for the increased use of ex-
plicit elections throughout the tax system. Rather, this Article merely seeks
to draw scholarly attention to the understudied role of explicit elections in
the income tax, and this Article endeavors to provide a framework for dis-
cussing how those elections are and should be used. This framework ac-
knowledges the compelling arguments against allowing taxpayers to choose
which tax laws apply to them but also suggests that there can be a place for
explicitly provided taxpayer choices in the tax law, particularly if imple-
mented in a way that maximizes their benefits. Explicit elections are en-
trenched in the tax law, but they need not be merely endured; in limited
circumstances and if designed carefully, explicit elections can be embraced
as valuable tools in the design and administration of the tax system.
Moreover, the study of explicit elections can provide insight into the
overall balance of power between the taxpayers and the government. Ex-
plicit elections involve the government affirmatively turning over to the tax-
payers the right to determine their own tax consequences. While
commentators often bemoan the taxpayers' seizing of the power to achieve
tax consequences that may be unintended by the government-i.e., tax plan-
ning-studying explicit elections may help us better understand the role that
taxpayers do and should have in determining their own tax treatment.
292 See generally Kaplow, supra note 285; Sunstein, supra note 285; Weisbach, supra note
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